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AN HISTORICAL ARGUMENT FOR THE RIGHT
TO COUNSEL DURING POLICE INTERROGATION
INTRODUCTION
Escobedo v. Illinois I raises once more before the Supreme Court the prob-
lem of the right to counsel during police interrogation. The facts of the case
are typical of several which have arisen during the past ten years. Danny
Escobedo, a twenty-two year old man of Mexican extraction, was suspected
of murdering his brother-in-law. The police brought Mr. Escobedo to the
station and proceeded to interrogate him. When he asked to be allowed to
speak to his attorney, the police refused. Later his attorney appeared at the
station showing the desk sergeant the Illinois statute which requires that
anyone held in custody be allowed to see his attorney "except in cases of im-
minent danger of escape. ' 2 The attorney caught sight of Escobedo, warned
him by sign to keep silent but was not allowed to speak to him. The interroga-
tion lasted about three hours. During that period, Escobedo later claimed,
the police attempted to incriminate his sister, confronted him with the charge
by his accomplice that he had actually committed the crime, and promised
him in Spanish that if he confessed, he would not be prosecuted. The police
explicitly denied only the last claim. Finally Escobedo confessed. At trial his
attorney objected to the introduction of the confession on two grounds, that
it was involuntary, and that it was obtained after a denial of counsel. The
trial judge, believing the police, ruled that the confession was voluntary. On
appeal,3 the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the trial judge on the question
1. 84 Sup. Ct. 203 No. 320 (1963). Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Illinois
which affirmed conviction sub nom., People v. Escobedo, 28 Ill. 2d 41, 190 N.E2d 825
(1963). The case is annotated 52 ILL. BAR J. 602 (1964). The facts are summarized
190 N.E2d at 826-27. Case docketed No. 615, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 3188 (U.S. Nov. 19,
1963).
2. ILL. REv. STATS. ch. 38, § 477 (1957). The relevant text reads:
All public officers, sheriffs, coroners, jailers, constables or other officers or persons
having the custody of any person committed, imprisoned or restrained of his liberty
for any alleged cause whatever, shall, except in cases of immediate danger of escape,
admit any practising attorney of law of this state, whom such person so restrained
of his liberty may desire to see or consult, to see and consult such person so im-
prisoned, alone and in private, at the jail or other place of custody....
3. In addition to the question of counsel and the question of the voluntariness of the
confession Escobedo also asked that his conviction be reversed on the grounds that the
trial judge had improperly excluded evidence of the effect on him of seeing his counsel
turned away at the door of the police station, that the trial judge should have granted a
directed verdict, and that the prosecutor had made inflammatory statements to the jury
in his summation. Brief for Plaintiff in Error, pp. 3-6, People v. Escobedo, 28 Ill.2d 41,
190 N.E. 2d 825 (1963). The Illinois Supreme Court ignored these questions but reversed
the conviction on the grounds of voluntariness. People v. Escobedo, No. 36707, 11. Sup.
Ct., January 14, 1963 (six justices for reversal, one dissent). Upon a motion for rehear-
ing by the state, the court reconsidered the facts and handed down the reported opinion,
supra. Especially stressed in the motion for rehearing were the fact that Escobedo had
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of voluntariness. Turning to the question of counsel, the court based affirmance
on its observations that "the right of the police to interrogate suspects has
never been seriously questioned," and that the presence of counsel at such
interrogations "'would effectively preclude all interrogation - fair as well
as iotfair.' "1 It is not necessary, the court said, for counsel to advise the ac-
cused of his rights during an interrogation; someone else can do that. In any
case, it thought Escobedo a clever young man, fully aware of his rights; his
attorney had advised him of his right to silence beforehand, he had refused
to answer questions during previous questioning at the police station, and
he even saw his attorney motioning him to silence. 5 The court went on to
construe the Illinois statute to mean that, though the police could not hold
a man from his attorney at all times, they could at some.6
The constitutional question raised by this case is not new to the Supreme
Court. In 1954 the Court considered it at length in the case of Crooker v.
California.7 In Crooker a thirty-one year old college graduate with one year
of law school training had confessed after twelve hours of police interrogation
to murdering his paramour. He urged first that his confession was involuntary
because the police refused him the access to counsel for which he had repeatedly
asked and because the police had failed to bring him before a magistrate.
Secondly, he urged that even if the confession were voluntary, it should be
excluded as evidence because it was obtained after the police refused his re-
quest for counsel.8 Mr. Justice Clark's opinion begins by noting that the facts
do not warrant holding the confession inadmissible on the ground of involun-
tariness. The opinion then considers the right to counsel question. 9 Justice
Clark does not say that there is no right to counsel before preliminary exami-
nation; the opinion concedes that the right is just as great in the pre-trial
seen his attorney motion him to silence and that there was no showing that the denial of
the attorney had any coercive effect (though the defence had offered evidence on this
point and the trial judge had excluded it). Motion for Rehearing by Defendant in Error,
pp. 2-3, People v. Escobedo, supra. See 190 N.E2d at 830.
4. Id. at 828, 829.
5. Escobedo denied that he understood what the attorney called, to him but he ad-
mitted that he saw him motion him to silence. Id. at 830.
6. These statutes show a legislative policy against the police or other public officers
insulating a person from his attorney, but it does not follow that the legislature
intended that the statute operate to insulate the person from the police or other
public officials.
Id. at 831.
7. 357 U.S. 433 (1958). The facts are detailed id. at 435-37.
8. These assertions of Crooker are very similar to the two questions presented by
Escobedo. Petition for Certiorari, p. 2, Escobedo v. Illinois, 84 Sup. Ct. 203 (1963).
Crooker seems to make another assertion, that the Court should exclude the evidence
solely because the police had failed to bring him before a magistrate as was required by
California law. The Court dismissed the problem as one of state law and administration,
thus refusing to apply McNabb-Mallory to the states. Since there is no constitutional
requirement that there be a magistrate's hearing, such an application, would have been
extremely forced. 357 U.S. at 437, 439 n.4. See note 69 infra.
9. Id. at 437-38.
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stages of the criminal process as at trial.10 Rather, Justice Clark reasons
that, just as due process (as then interpreted) does not demand the reversal
of every state court case which denies a man appointed counsel, 1 so also
due process does not demand the exclusion from a state trial of every con-
fession made after the denial of counsel. The Court will look at the totality
of the circumstances in the police procedure to determine whether the standards
of "fundamental fairness" have been violated by the denial of counsel. The
question apparently reduces to whether the petitioner was so well able to
represent himself in the process that the absence of counsel did not render
him helpless to resist the state. In the case of Crooker, the Court thought
his age, his experience, his knowledge of his legal rights all militated against
excluding his confession on due process grounds. 1
2
The holding in Crooker, then, turns not so much on the right as the remedy.
There may be a right to counsel in the police station, but it is not so absolute
as to demand in every case the exclusion of evidence in a state trial. Yet
Crooker was decided before Gideon v. Wainwright,"3 in which the Court
repudiated the "fundamental fairness" test relied on in Crooker and held
that the right to counsel at trial was so fundamental that a state conviction
of a man without counsel could under no circumstances meet the requirements
of due process. To the extent that Gideon thus undercuts the basis of Crooker,
a reconsideration of that case is now plainly due.
The basic question which Escobedo poses is how far a right traditionally
associated with hearings before judicial officers should be extended into the
interrogation process. In search of a basis for answering this question, the
bulk of this Comment will be devoted to an examination of the common law
history of the right to counsel, seeking to determine the value and function
of that right. If the right can be thus understood, it may then be possible to
essay a meaningful comparison between the interest of the individual in having
counsel at interrogation and the interest of the state in preserving the adminis-
tration of criminal justice - the balance attempted by Justice Clark in
Crooker. Such a comparison will necessarily require examination of the prac-
tice of interrogation and the arguments most frequently offered in support
of its necessity to the criminal process, as well as the means by which individual
interests in the presence of counsel at interrogation might be vindicated. The
Comment will consider these issues entirely from constitutional perspective.
Since there is a paucity of law on the topic of the right to counsel for misde-
meanors, the inquiry is confined to felonies.
14
10. Id. at 439.
11. See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) and notes 27-28 infra and accompany-
ing text.
12. 357 U.S. at 440.
13. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
14. For a discussion of the counsel problem in the context of misdemeanors, see
Comment, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 501 (1960). Cf. Harlan, J., concurring in Gideon v. Wain-
right, 372 U.S. at 351; note 46 infra. The right to counsel was at one time more assured
for misdemeanors than it was for felonies. See note 132 infra and accompanying text.
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Gideon AND COUNSEL AT JUDICIAL HEARING
Right to Counsel before Gideon
Between the leading case of Powell v. Alabama 15 and Gideon v. Wain-
wright,'0 the doctrinal struggles relating to right to counsel centered on three
issues. One debate concerned the distinction between federal and state right
to counsel; the second, the distinction between retained counsel and appointed
counsel ; the third concerned the remedy to be applied when the right to counsel
was violated.' 7
The right to retained counsel at a criminal trial is absolute in both state and
federal courts. In neither the federal nor the state systems does it seem ever
to have been denied; denial would doubtless be ample reason for grant of
habeas corpus. In federal courts, the right is guaranteed by the sixth amend-
ment ;18 in state courts, it is guaranteed by the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment, as well as by state constitutional provisions.1 9 The theory
of its application through the fourteenth amendment was stated by Mr. Justice
Sutherland in Powell v. Alabama.
It has never been doubted by this Court, or any other so far as we know,
that notice and hearing are preliminary steps essential to the passing of
an enforceable judgment .... What, then, does hearing include? Histori-
cally and in practice, in our own country at least, it has always included
the right to the aid of counsel when desired and provided by the party
asserting the right. The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of
little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.20
The right to appointed counsel at criminal trials in the federal courts is
guaranteed by the sixth amendment. The guarantee was first asserted in
15. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
16. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
17. Until 1932 there were practically no Supreme Court cases considering either the
implications of the 1789 Amendment to the Constitution which says, "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defence," U.S. ConsT. amend. VI, or the possibility that the 1868 Amendment which
iays, "No State shall . . .deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law," U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, might have some bearing on the right to
counsel. There are historical reasons for this seeming ignoring of the problem. See notes
181-84 infra and accompanying text.
An excellent treatise on the right to counsel before Gideon is BEANEY, THE RIGHT
To CouNsE. IN AMERICAN CoURTs (1955).
18. For federal cases ef., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); Walker v.
Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941) ; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
19. For state cases cf., Cash v. Culver, 358 U.S. 633 (1959); Moore v. Michigan,
355 U.S. 155 (1957); Uverges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948); Avery v. Ala-
bama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940).
The right to counsel is guaranteed by the constitution of every state except Virginia.
See Fellman, The Right to Counsel Under State Law, 1955 Wis. L. R-v. 281. In Vir-
ginia the "law of the land" clause has been held to embrace counsel. Cottrell v. Common-
wealth, 187 Va. 351, 46 S.E.2d 413 (1948). See also VA. CODE 19.1-214 (1960).
20. 287 U.S. at 68-69.
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Johnson v. Zerbst,21 in which the Court concluded that a right so necessary
for safeguarding "fundamental human rights" could not depend for its ex-
ercise on the financial situation of the accused. The purpose of the right, the
Court noted, was "to protect an accused from conviction resulting from his
own ignorance of his legal and constitutional rights. '22 If an accused cannot
afford counsel the Court must appoint one; if it fails to do so, habeas corpus
will lie.
23
Until Gideon v. Wainwright 24 the right to appointed counsel in a state trial
was somewhat uncertain. Powell v. Alabama 25 held that the helpless defendants
on trial for their lives in the Scottsboro Cases had to have counsel, and effective
counsel, appointed. The decision was based on the broad ground that a right
to hearing is fundamental to due process of law, and that the right to hearing
is worthless if it does not include the right to hearing through counsel. The
Court subsequently said that the right to appointed counsel extended to every
capital case .2 In Betts v. Brady,27 however, the Court held that the fourteenth
amendment does not require the appointment of counsel in every non-capital
felony case. Betts was a mature man, in full possession of his faculties, who, in
a simple robbery case tried before a scrupulously fair judge without a jury,
failed to establish his defense of alibi. Mr. Justice Roberts, writing for the
Court, examined the history of the right to counsel and found that it was not
regarded as fundamental in the English common law. Justice Roberts con-
cluded from this evidence that it was not "a fundamental right, essential to
a fair trial."2 Due process, the Court said, is
•. . a concept less rigid and more fluid than those [concepts] envisaged
in other specific and particular provisions of the Bill of Rights .... As-
serted denial is to be tested by an appraisal of the totality of facts in a
given case. That which may, in one setting, constitute a denial of funda-
mental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice, may, in other
circumstances . . . fall short of such denial. 29
Thus, the Court refused rigidly to impose upon the states responsibility to
protect the right by providing for appointment of counsel. Under Betts, the
denial of counsel was not an occasion for automatic reversal or habeas corpus;
the Court would look at all the facts of the case to see if the accused had been
denied fundamental fairness. Looking to the facts in Betts, the Court was not
shocked.
As far as the temporal sweep of the right to counsel is concerned, there is
already respectable doctrine in both state and federal courts requiring counsel
21. 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938).
22. Id. at 465.
23. Id. at 468.
24. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
25. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
26. Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940). See Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640
(1948). Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961) is the first direct holding on the topic.
27. 316 U.S. 455 (1942). Facts id. at 456-59, 472-73.
28. Id. at 471.
29. Id. at 462.
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for a considerable period of time before trial. The right to counsel at trial
involves the right to effective counsel, and it is uniformly held that counsel
must have sufficient time to prepare and to consult with his client before the
trial.30 In the federal courts the right to appointed counsel does not seem to
attach until arraignment, when the accused is formally charged and required
to plead.31 The defendant need not take the offer of counsel at arraignment,
but must be informed of his right. The right to retained counsel at arraignment
in the federal courts is unqualified. In the state courts, the right to retained
counsel at arraignment also is unqualified.m The right to appointed counsel
at arraignment was, until Gideon, governed by the same standards of funda-
mental fairness which governed the appointment of counsel for trial. 33 But
in 1961 the Supreme Court held that it is automatically prejudicial to make
a man plead in a capital case without counsel.
34
The right to counsel cases have arisen primarily in the context of arraign-
ment and post-arraignment proceedings. Prior to arraignment the issue of
counsel tends to become merged with problems of arrest, false imprisonment,
forced confession, police interrogation, and other peculiarly pre-trial problems.
Nonetheless, there was a fairly clear body of doctrine before Gideon that there
was a right to retained counsel but not to appointed counsel at preliminary
hearing in the federal courts.3 5 Courts seemed to rest this right more on fifth
amendment principles of due process and fair hearing than on the command
of the sixth amendment. 36 In White v. Maryland 37 the Supreme Court held
30. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 59 (1932); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S.
444, 446 (1940) ; cases collected in 23 A.L.R. 1382 (1923), 54 A.L.R 1225 (1928) and
3 A.L.R. 2d 1003 (1949).
31. FED. R. CRim. P. 44, has never been held to apply before arraignment.
After Johnson v. Zerbst there was some doubt as to the scope of the holding; in cases
in which the defendant had pleaded guilty without asking for counsel there was a tendency
to imply from his silence a waiver of counsel. Since the case of Walker v. Johnston, 312
U.S. 275 (1941), however, the rule has been that waiver of counsel at pleading must be
"explicit" and "intelligent." See BEANEY, op. cit. supra note 17, at 66-72.
32. Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954).
33. Compare Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948), with Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S.
155 (1957).
34. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
35. See Wood v. United States, 128 F.2d 265 (D.C. Cir. 1942); United States v.
Bollman, 24 Fed. Cas. 1189 (No. 14622) (C.C.D.C. 1807). Cf. Ex parte Chin Loy You,
223 Fed. 833 (D. Mass. 1915). See also FED. I_ Cram. P. 5(b).
36. Perhaps the courts chose the due process doctrine because Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458 (1938), seemed to hold that wherever the sixth amendment applied there must
be appointed as well as retained counsel, and the courts seemed hesitant to impose the
expense resulting from the requirement of appointed counsel at this stage of the pro-
ceedings. Perhaps the courts chose due process simply because the first modem case on
the topic, Ex parte Chin Loy You, supra note 35, was a deportation case in which the
specifically criminal procedures demanded by the sixth amendment did not apply. The
earliest case in the area, however, United States v. Bollman, supra note 35, seems to have
gone down on sixth amendment grounds.
37. 373 U.S. 59 (1963). White was decided after Gideon but did not rely on it.
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that where the accused in a capital case was required to plead at preliminary
hearing without counsel, his plea could not be introduced in evidence against
him at trial. No other state decision on the right to counsel at preliminary
hearing has ever reached the Court ;38 the state cases hold generally that there
is a right to retained counsel but no right to appointed counsel30 Some of
these decisions rest on due process notions of fair hearing; others on state
statutes which specifically require that retained counsel be admitted at pre-
liminary hearing or which generally forbid state officials to deny a man access
to counsel at any time.40 The remedy for the denial of the right at preliminary
hearing is uncertain. Denial of other rights at preliminary hearing has re-
sulated in vacating of the whole proceeding, requiring the state to begin again ;41
other precedent suggests that anything obtained at the hearing which is dam-
aging to the uncounseled defendent must be excluded at trial. 4
Right to Counsel after Gideon
It was against this background that Gideon v. Wainwright 43 was decided.
Gideon was convicted in a Florida court under circumstances which the Court
conceded to be indistinguishable from those of Betts. Both men were on trial
for property crimes; both were mature men who conducted reasonably compe-
tent defenses. Justice Black, for the Court, noted that in the years since Betts
it had become increasingly obvious that Betts was an anomaly in the field of
right to counsel.44 Under Betts, the determination under the fourteenth amend-
ment of right to counsel at trial depended on a finding of fundamental fair-
ness, while most of the early cases proceeded in a manner which suggested
that the right to counsel under the fourteenth amendment was equivalent to
that under the sixth, and thus absolute. Justice Black contrasts the position
of the uncounseled, indigent defendant with that of the state, which has un-
limited resources for investigation and counsel at its command. If the wealthy
38. But cf. In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957) holding that there is no right to
counsel before a fire warden's hearing from which criminal prosecution might result. See
also id. at 337 (Black, J. with Warren, Cj., Douglas and Brennan, J.J. dissenting).
39. See Martin v. Edmondson, 176 Kan. 374, 270 P.2d 791 (1954) ; Lambus v. Kaiser,
352 Mo. 122, 176 S.W2d 494 (1943); Lyons v. State, 77 Okla. Cr. 197, 242-44, 248, 138
P.2d 142, 166-68 (1943) ; State v. Braasch, 229 P.2d 289 (Utah 1951), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 910 (1952); Roberts v. State, 145 Neb. 658, 17 N.W.2d 666 (1945); Note, 44 Ky.
L.J. 103 (1955).
40. Due process: Martin v. Edmondson, supra note 39; Lambus v. Kaiser, supra
note 39. Lyons v. State, supra note 39. Statute: In re Both, 200 App. Div. 423, 192 N.Y.
Supp. 822 (1922). Among the statutes, see N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 15-87, 15-88 (1953);
TEXAS CODE CRIM. PRoc. art. 245 (1954).
41. See People v. Salas, 80 Cal. App. 318, 250 Pac. 526 (1926). Cf. In re Flodstrom,
134 Cal. App. 2d 871, 277 P.2d 101 (1954) ; State v. Smith, 35 So. 42 (Ala. 1903).
42. See White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963); Wood v. United States, 128 F.2d
265 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
43. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
44. Id. at 341.
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defendant may hire a lawyer to help him against this amassed power of the
state, why should the poor defendant be denied the opportunity of legal aid?
From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws
have laid great emphasis on... safeguards designed to assure ... [that]
every defendant stands equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot
be realized if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers
without a lawyer to assist him.
45
In the light of these considerations, the Court held the right to counsel to
be one of "those guarantees of the Bill of Rights which are fundamental safe-
guards of liberty immune from federal abridgment [and] . . . equally pro-
tected against state invasion by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 40
The implication of Gideon for the right to counsel as outlined above are
fairly clear. The Court will no longer refer to fundamental fairness as the
standard by which it determines whether a man should have counsel at trial
in the state courts; it will apply an absolute standard. The same conclusion
undoubtedly applies at arraignment. Only the defendant who explicitly and
intelligently waives counsel will now appear at trial or arraignment unaided.
The reasoning of Gideon also seems to require that there be a right to ap-
pointed counsel whenever there is a right to retained counsel. The present
distinction between right to retained counsel and right to appointed counsel
at preliminary examination in federal and state courts may thus be expected
to fall.47
The principal objection to an extension to preliminary hearing of the right
to appointed counsel is practical - that the cost of administering such a
program would be prohibitive. This was the objection raised when the Court
set about deciding Betts v. Brady; it is an argument to which the Court seems
45. Id. at 344.
46. Id. at 341.
Six justices joined in Justice Black's opinion; there were three concurrences. Mr.
Justice Douglas agreed with the Court's holding that the sixth amendment right to coun-
sel applied through the fourteenth but wished the Court had gone further to declare that
all the procedural rights of the Bill of Rights applied to the states through the four-
teenth. Id. at 345-47. Mr. Justice Clark agreed with the Court that Betts was an anomaly
in that it made a distinction between capital and non-capital cases. This distinction, he
declared, was meaningless for the right to counsel. Id. at 347-49. Mr. Justice Harlan con-
curred with the result but wished to dissociate himself from any notions of incorporation
of the Bill of Rights in the fourteenth amendment which might have been inherent in
the Court's opinion. Id. at 349-52. See generally Israel, Gideon v. Wainright: The "Art"
of Overruling, 1963 THE SuPPnm COURT REviEw (Kurland ed.) 211 (1963).
47. White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963), may be viewed as a step in this direc-
tion though the opinion does not mention Gideon, but rather goes down on the strength
of Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961), the case which required that counsel be
appointed for those pleading in a capital case. A line of cases seems to be developing
which demand appointed counsel at preliminary hearing if, and only if, something
"critical" takes place then. See Pettit v. Rhay, 383 P.2d 889 (Wash. 1963); State v.
Kirkland, 197 A2d 876 (App. Div. N.J. 1964).
19641 1007
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
now to pay little attention.48 If preliminary examination continued to play
the small part in the criminal process that it now plays, the cost would not
be too great.49 On the other hand, a right to appointed counsel during this
hearing might make the hearings considerably more common. Counseled
defendants might not waive hearing so often, and might try to prevent the
indefinite postponements of the hearing which often enable prosecutors to
avoid it altogether by resort to indictment. 50 This result would not add expense
to the trial process in every case. Some cases might be dismissed earlier, saving
expense for both the state and the defendant; in others the issues might be
clarified, shortening the trial process. There would indubitably, however, be
a residuum of extra expense. What this expense might be can only be approxi-
mated. In California, which has had appointed counsel at preliminary hearings
for a number of years, the expense has not proved inordinater' and criminal
statistics suggest that preliminary hearing has become a more significant part
of the process, with advantages resulting for both the state and the accused. -2
Gideon AND THE POLICE PROCESS
After a man is arrested and before he appears before a magistrate, there
is a separate proceeding held in the police station. In this proceeding the
polic will book, photograph, and fingerprint the man, perhaps display him in
a line-up, and almost invariably interrogate him, over a period which may
last from a few minutes to several days.5 3 Not only are various investigative
procedures carried out at this time, but there is a decision to be made, whether
the police will press the charges against the man and bring him before the
magistrate or whether they will release him.54 The accused must make a de-
48. Cf. Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956).
49. See generally A. Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage
in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1166-69 (1960). Comment, Metropolitan
Criminal Courts of First Instance, 70 HARv. L. REv. 320, 323-29 (1956). In the District
of Columbia, under a haphazard system of appointment, lawyers almost invariably advise
waiver of preliminary hearing. See Letter from Myron P. Ehrlich to David G. Bress,
January 15, 1958, in Goldstein & Goldstein, Cases and Materials on Criminal Procedure,
ch. vi, 31-33, 1961 (unpublished materials in Yale Law Library).
50. See United States v. Gray, 87 F. Supp. 436 (D.D.C. 1949).
51. See People v. Williams, 124 Cal. App. 2d 32, 268 P.2d 156 (1954) ; CAl. PENAL
CODE § 866.5 (1957) ; id. § 859 (Supp. 1963) ; Cuff, Public Defender System: The Los
Angeles Story, 45 MINN. L. Rav. 715, 730 (1961) ; David, Institutional or Private Coun-
sel: A Judge's View of the Public Defender System, id. 753, 768.
52. The criminal statistics of the state do not show what counsel has done for the
preliminary hearing, but the unusually large dismissal of felony complaints for insuffi-
cient evidence suggests that counsel's activity is making this hearing a significant screen.
See STATE OF CALIF., DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN CALIF. 1959, 46; id. 1960, 78; id. 1961,
89.
53. For typical police procedure, see KENNEY & WILLIA S, POLICE OPERATIONS;
PoucIEs AND PROCEDURES (1960).
54. See J. Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low
Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543 (1960).
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cision as well; whether he will confess his guilt and go on to plead guilty or
whether he will attempt to defend himself against the charges. If the commit-
ting magistrate turns the man over to the jail authorities - that is, in the
typical state, moves him from the police detention cell to the county jail -
the police may come to the county jail and interrogate him there. If he posts
bond, they may come to his home. Neither practice, however, seems common,
and, as a general rule, police interrogation is over once the accused moves
out of the hands of the police.55
Since the entire police process is substantially hidden from public view,
little is known about any aspect of these decisions. Though the literature on
police interrogation is vast,56 the present state of our knowledge about this
area is inadequate.5 7 Such important questions as the percentage of crimes
solved by confessions obtained throifigh interrogation are still unanswered.
It might be possible to ascertain the percentage of trials in which confessions
play a part, but this alone would give us a very distorted picture since ninety
per cent of the people convicted of crime are convicted on a plea of guilty.58
Nor has any thorough study been made since the Wickersham Report on just
what methods are employed by the police during interrogation. 59 We know
just enough about the process to define the relevant area of inquiry.
Formal interrogation by the police while a man is in custody falls into
two sometimes overlapping categories.60 Often a man has been "picked up"
not because the police suspect him of guilt but because he is thought to know
something of the crime under investigation; in this case the police are after
not a confession but simply evidence of the crime. The legal problems involved
55. See note 268 infra.
56. See Way, The Supreme Court and State Coerced Confessions, 12 J. PUB. L. 53
(1963); Ritz, Twenty-Five Years of State Criminal Confessions in the U.S. Supreme
Court, 19 WASH. & LE L. REv. 35, 202 (1962); Symposium: Police Interrogation
Privileges and Limitations, 52 J. CPux. L., C. & P.S. 1-73 (1961), in POLICE POWER
AND INDIVIDUAL FREnOM 129-212 (Sowle ed. 1962) [hereinafter cited as SowLE]. Bib-
liography in Hearings before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 13, at 748-65 (1958) [hereinafter
referred to as 1958 Scrate Hearings], reprinted in 50 J. CPIM. L., C. & P.S. 175-85
(1959). Among the manuals of interrogation are: INBAU & REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGA-
TION AND CONFESSIONS (1962); O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION
(1956) ; KIDD, POLICE INTERROGATION (1940).
57. See Weisberg, Police Interrogation of Arrested Persons, 52 J. CRIM. L., C. &
P.S. 21 (1961), in SOWLE at 153.
58. See A. Goldstein, supra note 49, at 1163 n.37; ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
FROM ARREsT To APPEAL 297-98 (1947).
59. U.S. NATIONAL COMMISSION oN LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT
ON LAWLEssNESS IN ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAw (1931) [hereinafter cited as 4 WICKER-
SHAM]. See Equal Justice under the Law, in JUSTICE, 5 U.S. CO ,ISSION ON CIVIL
RIGHTS REPORTS 5-28 (1961). The American Bar Foundation's promised study of the ad-
ministration of criminal justice in the United States should follow up Wickersham, but
so far none of this has appeared. SHERRY, THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
IN THE UNITED STATES; PLAN FOR A SURVEY (1955).
60. See INBAU & RLEI, op. cit. supra note 56, at 21, 88, 116.
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in this interrogation of witnesses chiefly concern the law of arrest. If the police
have no probable cause to believe a person guilty of a particular crime, they
have no right to arrest him; yet such "arrest" practices apparently are preva-
lent.61 To allow counsel for these persons would certainly cut down on the
number of illegal arrests. Because reliable information is unavailable, it is
difficult to predict what effect such an extension would have on the efficiency
of the investigative process. 62
Fears of the implications of change are greatest when the interrogation of
suspects, rather than witnesses is at issue. In such cases the police are reason-
ably certain of a man's guilt; they seek not only evidence but also a confession,
or, failing that, incriminating admissions. Although they seem tractable on
the subject of counsel for witnesses, police insist that interrogation of suspects
cannot be conducted in the presence of counsel.63 What is learned from interro-
gating a suspect is more likely to be repudiated than what is learned from in-
terrogating a witness; the suspect, unlike the witness, may do his own cause
great harm by his answers to questions. The methods used to obtain admissions
from a suspect are more likely to be questionable than the methods used on a
witness, for the police, who need the witness' testimony at trial, have reason
to treat the latter in a kindly fashion. Anything obtained from a suspect, how-
ever, will be admissible at trial, whether the accused testifies or not, by the
admissions exception to the hearsay rule.64
In the federal criminal system the McNabb-Mallory rule 65 has indirectly
extended the domain of the right to counsel by severely limiting the duration
of the low-visibility process at the police station. Rule Five (a) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the police to bring an arrested person
before a magistrate "without unnecessary delay." Once a man is before the
magistrate he is told of his procedural rights, including the right to counsel,
and is given an opportunity to obtain counsel. The McNabb-Mallory rule,
adopted by the Supreme Court as a means of enforcing Rule Five, requires
61. See Foote, Safeguards in the Law of Arrest, 52 Nw. UJL. REv. 16 (1957). See
generally BA.RTH, THE PRIcE or LimRTY (1961).
62. That the prosecutor has other methods for interrogating unwilling witnesses,
before a Grand Jury or at a preliminary hearing, should make a witness willing to
answer questions in a more informal setting.
63. Justice Jackson so argues in Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (con-
curring opinion). The argument is assumed in, Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 441
(1958).
64. 3 WIGuoRE, EVmENCE §§ 815-16 (3d ed. 1940). See generally id. at §§ 817-67
and id. at 82-134 (1962 Supp.).
65. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318
U.S. 332 (1942).
The literature on McNabb-Mallory is vast: See Bibliography in 1958 Senate Hear-
ings at 762-65. More recent materials are Police Detention and Arrest Privileges: An
International Symposium, 51 J. Ca m. L., C. & P.S. 385 (1960), in Sowr at 9-73;
Note, Pre-Arraignment Interrogation and the McNabb-Mallory Miasma, 68 YALE L.J.
1003 (1959) ; Hogan & Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale and Rescue,
47 GEo. L.J. 1 (1958).
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the exclusion at trial of confessions and admissions 66 obtained during police
custody extending for an unnecessary length of time. Though the rule does
not specifically relate to counsel, it helps to effectuate, and was intended to
effectuate the right,67 by ensuring that the magistrate's advice about counsel
is given at any early stage in the process. And although counsel's right to be
present at interrogation is not established in the federal criminal procedure,
it appears that once this hearing is held, and counsel obtained, interrogation,
for all practical purposes, stops.68 Since the McNabb-Mallory rule is not a
constitutional doctrine, but rather is grounded in the Court's powers of super-
vision over the administration of federal justice, it does not apply to the states.6 9
When it wishes to control state police processes the Supreme Court relies
on constitutional doctrines, oriented to specific police abuses, such as the
doctrine of coerced confession or the doctrine of right to counsel. Crooker
is one of the two cases in which the Court has considered overthrowing a con-
fession solely because it was obtained after a denial of counsel. The other
case, Cicenia v. LaGay,7° was a companion case to Crooker, and was treated
by the Court in far more cursory fashion. The petitioner in Cicenia had been
66. It is unclear whether only confessions and admissions are excluded by the rule
or whether all evidence, including such things as gunpowder tests and fingerprints, ob-
tained beyond the time of "necessary delay" is excludable. In Watson v. United States,
249 F.2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1957) the issue was raised obliquely but the case went down on
the exclusion of a confession. In United States v. Klapholz, 230 F.2d 494 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 351 U.S. 924 (1956), there is dictum to the effect that "all" evidence is to be
excluded. See generally Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948) ; United States v.
Carignan, 342 U.S. 36 (1951).
67. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455 (1957). See also Memorandum on
the Detention of Arrested Persons and Their Production before a Committee Magistrate,
in 2 CHAFFm, DOCUMENTS ix FUNDAmENTAL HumAx RIGHTS 541 (1951-52).
68. See note 268 infra and accompanying text.
69. 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1942). It has been argued that Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471 (1963), has made McNabb-Mallory a constitutional doctrine by holding
that a confession which was the product of an illegal arrest and entry must be excluded
under the Mapp doctrine. See Broeder, Wong Sun v. United States: A Study in Faith
and Hope, 42 NEB. L. REv. 483, 557-65 (1963). Wong Sun, however, was a federal case,
and the statements obtained were clearly the product of the arrest' and seizure by the
officers. 371 U.S. at 484-87. The Court distinguished the case in which the evidence would
not have come to light "but for" the illegal arrest from the case at bar in which the
illegal evidence was the product of an "exploitation" of illegality. Id. at 488. In any case
the Court will have difficulty making arraignment "without unnecessary delay" into a
constitutional doctrine since there is no constitutional requirement that there be a magis-
trate's hearing. Escobedo is raising arguments based on Wong Sun before the Court
though he will have to overcome an initial difficulty of showing the illegality of his arrest.
See Brief for the Petitioner, pp. 25-27, Escobedo v. Illinois, 84 Sup. Ct 203 (1963);
Petition for Certiorari, id. at 7.
One state, Michigan, has adopted the McNabb rule by judicial decree. People v.
Hamilton, 359 Mich. 410, 102 N.W.2d 738 (1960). Another state, Connecticut, has
adopted a modified version in statute. CoNN. PmLic AcTs 1963, No. 126.
70. 357 U.S. 504 (1958). Facts id. at 505-06; Application of Cicenia, 148 F. Supp.
98, 99 (D.NJ. 1956).
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surrendered by his attorney to the police, who proceeded to question him for
seven hours, until he confessed. Meanwhile, his attorney was at the door,
demanding that he be allowed to see his client. The Court held the confession
properly admitted at trial. Although the Court found the procedure followed
by the police in Cicenia distasteful, it discovered no compelling necessity to
warrant what it considered the extraordinary measure of upsetting a state
conviction and excluding evidence which the state court had found admissible.
There was no careful examination of the petitioner's age and experience to
see whether the police procedure shocked the judicial conscience as there had
been in Crooker. It has been suggested, however, that Cicenia's consultation
with his lawyer before going to the police station affected the Court's decision
by raising a presumption that he knew of his rights. 71 The Court's citation
of Crooker for the proposition that there is no right to counsel before prelimi-
nary examination 72 is surprising, since Crooker contains no such statement
and in fact suggests the contrary to be true; the brevity of the opinion and
the fact that it followed so closely on Crooker justify the conclusion that the
citation expresses little more than a desire to avoid further elucidation of the
reasoning developed in the earlier case. Subsequent cases in the lower federal
courts, dealing with both state and federal claims, seem to have preferred
Crooker itself to Cicenia's reading of it, and have treated the denial of counsel
as an issue independent of the voluntariness of the challenged confession. At
least three courts have found that in some cases fundamental fairness demands
that the court exclude a confession because counsel was denied, even in the
absence of any finding that the confession was involuntary.
73
The right to counsel and the implications of Gideon are less clear in the
stages prior to judicial hearing. If there were a federal right to counsel in
the police station under the sixth amendment, this right would presumably
apply to the states under Gideon, since that case seems to render the fourteenth
amendment right to counsel co-extensive with the sixth amendment right.
The Supreme Court, however, has dealt with the problem of the federal right
to counsel in the police station only indirectly, through the medium of its
power to make evidentiary rules for the federal courts, so that it has never
had to reach the issue of a sixth amendment right. Even so, Gideon may effect
the validity of the Crooker doctrine. The Court's indication in Crooker that
it would determine the right to counsel in the police station on a case by case
basis, examining the totality of the circumstances, was premised upon the
71. Sde Lee v. United, States, 322 F2d 770, 773 (5th Cir. 1963).
72. 357 U.S. at 508.
73. See Lee v. United States, 322 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1963); Griffith v. Rhy, 282
F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1015 (1961) ; and previous to Crooker,
see Ex parte Sullivan, 107 F. Supp. 514 (D. Utah 1952) rehearing sub norn. Sullivan v.
Utah, 126 F. Supp. 64 (1954), reversed, 227 F.2d, 511 (10th Cir. 1955), cert. denied sub
nor. Braasch v. Utah, 350 U.S. 973 (1956). See also Weisberg, supra note 57, at 42-43,
in SoWLE 153, 178.
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similar approach of Betts v. Brady 74 to the problem of the right to appointed
counsel at trial. Now that this method of determination has been overruled
so far as trial is concerned, it would not be illogical for the Court to declare
that the method was also invalid as a means for determining the right to
counsel before trial.
The same arguments which were urged against fundamental fairness as
a standard for determining the right to counsel at trial may be urged against
it as a standard for determining the right to counsel in the police station.75 A
case decided by the standard of fundamental fairness has limited value as
precedent since it provides only vague principles to guide those who must
enforce the standard. If it is almost impossible for a lawyer to predict how
the Court will go on a given set of facts, a policeman, with only limited train-
ing in the law, must be even more in the dark as to the standard that the
Court is laying down.76 Further, the "fundamental fairness" approach as ap-
plied to counsel problems involves a retrospective determination of prejudice;
it involves the court in speculation of what might have been. In some cases
one may look back and say that had counsel been present, the case would
have gone the other way; in others, it is simply impossible to tell. A closer
examination of the seemingly simple facts of Betts, for example, reveals that
under proper cross-examination the state's principal witness might not have
seemed so trustworthy nor Betts' alibi so implausible.77 One of the most
remarkable documents to come out of the Crooker case shows that Crooker,
far from being the knowledgeable law student pictured in the Court's opinion,
was a very confused young man, on the verge of a complete nervous break-
down, who confessed to committing a crime in a way in which he could not
possibly have committed it.7 8 The Court cannot tell what facts an early
investigation by competent counsel would have revealed, not only facts bearing
on the question of whether the accused committed the act charged but also
facts bearing on the issue of Inens rea, on the degree of criminality, or on the
possible issue of insanity. Finally, the standard of fundamental fairness creates
a curious hierarchy of constitutional rights. By applying the standard of fun-
damental fairness, the Court is in effect saying that there are some rights
which any man accused of crime may have and there are some which he may
have only if he is ignorant, unfortunate, colored, young, or inexperienced.
74. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
75. Rothblatt & Rothblatt, Police Interrogation: The Right to Counsel and Prompt
Arraignment, 27 BROOKLYN L. REv. 24, 31-33 (1960).
76. The police themselves frequently argue for definite standards from the courts. See
Coakley, Restrictions in the Law of Arrest, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 2 (1957); Inbau, Restric-
tions in the Law of Interrogation and Confessions, id. at 77; 1958 Semte Hearings at
88 (statement of Joseph D. Lohman); Lumbard, The Administration of Crimzinal Justice:
Some Problems and Their Resolution, 49 A.B.A.J. 840 (1963).
77. See Kamisar, Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue
on the Most Pervasive Right of an Accused, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 42-56 (1962).
78. See Crooker's statement in, PRETTYMAN, DEATH AND THE SUPREME COURT, 175-
208 (1961).
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That such a hierarchy of rights should be associated with due process of law
is especially ironic in the face of our notions of equal protection of the laws
and the equality of all persons before the law.
Not only does Gideon refuse to apply the standard of fundamental fairness
to right to counsel questions, but it also calls for a return to the absolute
standard of counsel expounded in Powell. justice Sutherland's dictum in
Powell that the accused has a right to counsel at "every step in the proceedings
against him,"7 9 might well be thought to imply that the right is just as valid
in police proceedings as it is in judicial. Chief Justice Warren, and Justices
Black, Douglas, and Brennan dissented in Crooker on the ground that the
right to counsel applies absolutely to every stage of the criminal proceeding,
including the police stage ;80 each of these Justices has reaffirmed his views
in subsequent cases.81 Other members of the Court have shown some hesi-
tancy to apply constitutional doctrines to the police stage of state criminal
proceedings. Yet it is possible to speculate that this hesitancy arises more
from a concern for the remedy to be applied when state officials violate an ac-
cused's constitutional rights than from the propriety of declaring the right
itself. Such certainly proved the case in the search and seizure field, where
the Court discovered the constitutional right 8? some fourteen years before
it found an exclusionary rule necessary to enforce it.83 In fact, justice Clark's
opinion in Crooker seemed to recognize the right, but declared that, under
the circumstances, no remedy would be afforded. Given the subsequent adop-
tion, in Mapp v. Ohio,84 of a rule requiring exclusion of evidence in state
court proceedings if that evidence was discovered by reason of an unreasonable
search and seizure, recognition and enforcement of a right to counsel during
the police stage of criminal proceedings seem quite possible.
Tian ANALYSIS OF Crooker
If the Court is going to abandon the "fundamental fairness" approach of
Crooker, the standard of Gideon is the most obvious alternative. There are,
however, differences between Gideon and Crooker which might lead the Court
to be wary of declaring that there is an absolute right to counsel in the police
stage. The striking thing about Gideon is that the only opposition to it, with
79. 287 U.S. at 69.
80. 357 U.S. at 441-48.
81. See, e.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 637-41 (1961) (Douglas and
Black, JJ., concurring); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 324-26 (1959) (Douglas,
Black and Brennan, JJ., concurring); id. at 326-27 (Stewart, Douglas, and Brennan,
J., concurring); Ashdown v. Utah, 357 U.S. 426, 431-32 (1958) (Douglas and Black,
JJ., dissenting) ; Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504, 511-12 (1958) (Warren, CJ., Douglas
and Black, J., dissenting). Cf. Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 274-76 (1960)
(Warren, CJ., Douglas, Black, and Brennan, J., espousing "selective incorporation");
Henlin, "Selective Incorporation" in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YAi L.J. 74 (1963).
82. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
83. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
84. Ibid.
1014 [Vol. 73 : 1000
COUNSEL AT INTERROGATION
its overruling of Betts, came from those who argued that the Supreme Court
should not force a change of policy upon the states. 5 At the time of Betts, a
decision to require appointment in felony cases would have forced thirteen
states to make some change in policy; by the time of Gideon only four states
were substantially affected.8 6 On the other hand, no state commands the
presence of counsel in the police station and only two states, Connecticut and
Michigan, have limited the scope of the police process with rules similar to
McNabb-Mallory.8 7 Thus, while the Court's decision requiring appointed
counsel at trial followed the lead of most of the states, a decision requiring
even retained counsel in the police station would force a change upon almost
all states. When it comes to consider the overruling of Crooker, the Court
will be strongly urged to balance against the interest of the accused in having
counsel at interrogation the states' interest in avoiding fundamental and per-
haps expensive changes in the administration of criminal justice.
In examining these opposing interests in Crooker 8 8 Justice Clark weighed
the interest of the accused in a right which he found was historically not fun-
85. See Brief for the Respondent, pp. 47-56, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963). See also Brief for Alabama as Amicus Curiae, pp. 2-13, ibid.
86. Twenty-two states submitted amicus briefs urging that Betts was "an anachronism
when handed down"; only two states submitted briefs to the contrary. 372 U.S. at 345.
Only four states, Florida, Alabama, North and South Carolina did not require either by
statute or practice appointment of counsel in felony cases involving a substantial sentence
(3-5 years and up). Kamisar, Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1, 14-20 (1962). See Jaffee, Legal Escape, This Week, Feb. 16, 1964, at
4-5, for an interesting example of popular reaction to a Supreme Court decision.
Betts was also unpopular in legal literature. See, e.g., Kamisar, supra; Right to Coun-
sel: A Symposium, 45 Mnxx. L. Rtv. 693 (1961); BEANEY, op. cit. supra note 17, at
299-335.
87. A number of states have statutes designed to provide the accused with counsel at
an early stage in the process. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 825 (1959) ; ILL. R y. STAT. ch. 38
§ 477 (1957) ; LA. Ray. STAT. § 15.77 (1951) ; Mo. STAT. ANN. § 544.170 (1953). It may
be doubted, however, whether these statutes have any impact on police policy since, like
the statutes in almost every state which command prompt arraignment, they have no teeth
in them and the courts have refused to build teeth into them. See note 277 infra.
In People v. Donovan-, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963), the
New York Court of Appeals held 5-4 that a confession obtained during an illegal deten-
tion and after counsel had been denied access to the prisoner must be excluded at trial
because the police had violated the defendant's right to counsel and his privilege against
self-incrimination under the New York Constitution. See note 273 infra. Cf. People v.
Noble, 9 N.Y.2d 571, 175 N.E.2d 451, 216 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1961) (confession excluded when
D.A. during interrogation refused to answer defendant's query as to whether he had a
right to counsel).
For Connecticut and Michigan see note 69 supra; Connecticut v. Kroezel, File no.
mv-12-7131 AP, App. Div. Cir. Ct., March 5, 1963 (dismissing drunken driving charge
when police after interrogation refused to allow defendant to call lawyer).
Most states do not command the presence of counsel before preliminary examination.
See Pulaski v. State, 126 N.W.2d 625, 630-31 (Wis. 1964) ; People v. Kelly, 404 Ill. 281,
89 N.E.2d 27 (1949) ; Linkins v. State, 207 Md. 212, 218-19, 96 A.2d 246, 249-50 (1953);
State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881 (1953).
88. 357 U.S. at 439-41.
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damental against the value of interrogation, which he assumed to be the most
vital part of the states' investigative process. If one strikes the balance in this
way, there can be little doubt of the conclusion. The defendant's right will
certainly not be absolute; the likelihood that any right of his will be enforced
is slim. The question is, whether the elements brought into the inquiry by
Justice Clark were accurately described, or even the only elements to be con-
sidered.
For the proposition that the right to counsel is not one of basic values of
our criminal system Justice Clark relies on Justice Roberts' opinion in
Betts v. Brady.'9 Justice Roberts tried to measure the value of the right to
counsel by looking to its history to determine how long the right had been in
existence, and how much it seemed to be an integral part of the criminal
process. When Justice Roberts looked at the history of counsel, he relied
on those historians 00 who told him that the right was essentially American
in origin and that, unlike the right to trial by jury it was not a basic right
in our common law heritage. He regarded the right as a recent grant of largess,
given only when society could afford it, and thus to be protected only
if there would be few if any undesirable effects on the state.,' Such an his-
torical analysis leads naturally to a presumption against the right to counsel.
Justice Clark also assumes with Justice Roberts that historically the func-
tion of counsel was to help the accused work his way through the intricacies
of trial and therefore, that an accused's need for counsel became greater as
the trial process became more complex. Under such reasoning, there is little
reason to expand the right to counsel into the police station, where legal
questions are relatively simple and where there is no opportunity to make
a formal defense. All the accused needs in the police station is someone to
advise him of his legal rights, such as his right to silence. Crooker, said the
Court, did not need counsel; he already knew his rights. 92 For those who
do not know their rights, others, such as the police, can advise them.
Justice Clark does not deny that the accused has other needs in the police
station which might be met by the presence of counsel. He was aware of
the assertions that "a person accused of crime needs a lawyer right after
his arrest probably more than at any other time,' 93 not only to inform him
of his rights, but also to protect him from police brutality, and to begin the
preparation of his defense while the case is still fresh.9 4 But the Justice implied
89. 316 U.S. at 465-71.
Justice Clark also relies on 1 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 696-700 (Car-
rington ed. 1927) which gives the history substantially as Justice Roberts did.
90. For the prevailing view of the history see BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN
AMERICAN COURTS 8-24 (1955); but cf. PLUCKxETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE
COMMON LAW 410 (1948) ; 4 BLACKSTOxE, COMMENTARIES *355-56 (Cooley ed. 1899).
91. 316 U.S. at 465-71.
92. 357 U.S. at 440.
93. CHAFFEE, op. cit. .upra note 67.
94. 357 U.S. at 443-48 (dissent).
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that counsel should not serve this function, that other means of control -
such as the exclusion of involuntary confessions and prompt arraignment -
could do the job equally well. His arguments reflect a more general theory
which finds two stages in the criminal process, an informal fact-finding stage,
and a formal accusatorial stage. Historically, it is urged, the provisions of
the Bill of Rights relating to criminal procedures were meant to apply only
to the latter, which involve judicial rather than executive functions. If the pro-
visions are applied to the police stage, the principle of the separation of powers
will be violated.95
In order to judge the validity of Justice Clark's proposition as to the value
and function of counsel, it is necessary to look to the history of the right.
Concerning the value of counsel we shall look to see whether the right to
counsel is an ancient right or a recent grant which society could afford only
as it became stronger and whether when the right to counsel has been limited
or denied in the past, the accused has managed to do without it. Concerning
the function of counsel we shall look to see whether counsel was present in
the past simply to aid with technicalities or whether he has served a broader
function. Finally, if we have had counsel in the past for a particular stage
in the process to serve a specific function, we shall inquire at what stage in
the process today counsel should be present in order to serve that function.
Before continuing further, it is relevant to ask why Justice Clark chose
to inquire into history, or, phrased more broadly, whether an inquiry into
history is really useful for this kind of discussion. Police interrogation, after
all, is a modern problem. Since there is no historical equivalent of police in-
terrogation, at least in the ordinary criminal process, history is a poor source
of binding precedent for the problem at hand. There is a tendency today to
minimize the benefits of precedent when dealing with a problem not known
in the past. This arises, perhaps, as an overreaction to recent judicial history.
Many judges of the nineteenth century felt that old legal doctrine could be
applied to new situations by a process of absolute deductive logic, without
the need to'make any value judgment. The recognition that their assumptions
were false - that in applying old legal doctrine to new situations the decision
can go either way depending on the values of the judge - has made judges
wary of using history at all. Faced with a contemporary problem, the judge
who is not satisfied to derive these values from personal prejudice will most
often turn to empirical study to discover the values which are at issue. This
method works well when one is dealing with a problem like child labor, which
may be analyzed through statistics and which, when analyzed, reveals the
choice of values clearly.
Empirical analysis is of little help, however, when the modern problem is
one like police interrogation - an invisible process, about which the few
known facts are contradictory, in which the effect of the probative decision
cannot be measured, and concerning which sufficient material is well-nigh
95. See note 265 infra and accompanying text.
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impossible to gather. Faced with such a problem, the judge who does not
consult history may be ignoring the most important available source of in-
formation. As a source of understanding of the values which have shaped
his society, an inquiry into history may always be relevant to a judge seeking
to answer a question of values. In the right to counsel field, historical inquiry
is more than usually relevant, for there is little precedent on the problem
between 1791 and 1932. Though the Justices who first considered the right
in modem times presented a review of that history,9 6 it is possible that more
recent research 97 may prove them mistaken. It is not necessary to seek in
history an absolute value for counsel and to apply that value blindly to the
modem situation - an approach which confuses eclecticism with valuable
instruction. The Supreme Court has used historical analysis in the area of
criminal procedure to gain a better understanding of modem problems.9 8 By
following the lead of the Court it may be possible to find a guide to under-
standing the modem problem of counsel during interrogation.
THE HISTORY OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The Common Law Right to Counsel
The first mention in English law of persons serving the functions of coun-
sel occurs in the Leges Henrici Primi, which Liebermann dates c. 1115:
De causis criminalibus uel capitalibus . . . nemo quaerat consilium, quin
inplacitatus statim perneget sine omni peticione consilii, ciuscumque na-
cionis uel condicionis sit: uel eius affirmacionem uel negacionem defensor
aut dominus prosequatur competenti termino comprobandum.0 9
Most authorities have cited this passage for the proposition that counsel has
been denied in felony cases from the very beginning of English law.100 Cer-
tainly the first passage, with its phrase nemo quaerat consilium - let no man
96. There is also a review of the history in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60-65
(1932).
97. See, e.g., three articles of Heidelbaugh & Becker, Benefit of Counsel in Criminal
Cases in the Time of Coke, 6 MI.n L.Q. 546 (1952); Blackstone's Use of Mediaval
Law in Criminal Cases Involving Benefit of Counsel, 7 id. 184 (1953); Right to Counsel
in Criminal Cases, 28 NoThE DAME LAw, 351 (1953); Rackow, The Right to Counsel:
English and American Precedents, 11 W-r. & MARY QUART. 1 (3d ser. 1954).
98. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60-65 (1932) ; Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616, 624-33 (1886).
99. 1 LBERmANN, GEsEzE DER ANGELSACHSEN 547, 571 (1903). Lex 47.
From the somewhat dubious Latin of the Leges the author of this Comment attempts
a translation:
In criminal or capital cases let no man seek consilium; rather let him forthwith
deny [the charge] without having pleaded [having impleaded?] [and] without any
asking for consilium, of whatever nation or state of life he may be; [then] let his
defendor or his lord follow up his affirmance [affirmative defense] or denial by the
appropriate method of proof.
For Blackstone's freer and more fanciful translation, see 4 B.cxKsToxN, op. cit.
supra note 90, *355 n. 3.
100. E.g., I PorLocK & MAnTArD, I-hSTORy OF ENGLIsH LAw 211-12 (2d ed. 1959).
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seek consilium - is suggestive of this interpretation. But such an interpreta-
tion may involve a misunderstanding of the word consilium. The consilium in
Anglo-Saxon and early Norman procedure was not necessarily a man learned
in the law who saw to it that the defendant's rights were not invaded; the
term also referred to a motley crew of friends and relatives brought to the
court to sway the judgment, to vouch for the accused, and to serve as wit-
nesses or body-guards, as the case might require.10 1 That the accused was
entitled to representation at trial in some respects is seen from the second
part of this passage from the Leges, uel eius afllrmacionem uel negacionem
defensor aut dominus prosequatur competenti termino comprobandum, which
may be translated as follows: "Let the accused's lord or defendor follow up
his affirmance [affirmative defense?] or denial by the appropriate method
of proof."
It is difficult to know exactly what is being forbidden the felony defendant
since the author of the Leges is not precise in his words. It seems clear from
other sources, however, that around the time of the Leges defendants com-
monly availed themselves of three modes of legal representation. The pleader,
0 2
a man learned in the law who would handle the technicalities of pleading,
provided professional advice as to the law. This man first appears in the
Norman courts around the turn of the thirteenth century, where he is called
the countour in Norman French or the narrator in Latin. Although the
narrator was apparently unknown in the early Norman courts, another person,
the placitator,0 3 seems to have filled the same function. The attornatus,"'4 who
first appears in records around the time of Glanville (the end of the twelfth
century) was a second source of legal assistance. This man is not a professional
pleader, who helps a man in court, but an authorized deputy who appears in
court in a man's stead; he is an attorney for that trial in the full sense of the
word, but he is not a professional attorney as we would know him today. The
third source of legal assistance '05 was the advocatus or forespeca of Anglo-
Saxon law, who was the surety or warranty for the accused. He was usually
the man's lord and defended not on the defendant's behalf but on his own.
Within this function we might include that of the defensor or champion in
trial by combat and perhaps even in trial by the hundred.
Since there were so many kinds of legal assistance in the Middle Ages, all
performed by different people, the use of the modern word "counsel" is in-
accurate to describe any one of them. We might better look upon these various
offices as types of representation analogous to modern counsel. Confusion is
further generated because the term consilium is used at various places in the
mediaeval texts to describe each of the particular kinds of legal assistance 106
101. See COHEN, ISTORY OF THE ENGLISH BAR 11, 13, 18 (1929).
102. See generally id. at 59-62, 169-82.
103. Id. at 59-62.
104. Id. at 127-43. See PLUCk're', op. ct. supra note 90, at 205-06.
105. COHEN, op. cit. supra note 101, at 3, 5, 9, 11, 36.
106. E.g., in the Leges 46, 5, it obviously refers to a pleader. 1 LIEDmEANN, op. cit.
supra note 99, at 570.
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as well as to refer to the crowd of friends brought along to sway the moot
in a more informal way. It seems that the passage in the Leges quoted above
is best read as a reference to the latter. Before a man gets to plead and before
he makes his defense, he must first deny the charge (inplacitatus perneget).
After this let his defensor or his dominus follow the matter up (prosequatur)
with the proof. Rather than denying the accused the opportunity for any
assistance, the Leges would deny him only the opportunity to cook up an alibi
with his friends or to wait until his accuser was without aid and intimidate
him with a potent throng of consiliu n-a practice which apparently was com-
mon at the time in civil cases. 1 7 What we find in this passage, then, is not a
notion that the defendant should be without procedural safeguards, but that in
criminal cases he should not be allowed to avail himself of extra-procedural
safeguards.
In order to get some idea of how these various offices fitted into the medi-
aeval criminal process it is necessary to understand a little of mediaeval
criminal procedure. We can give only the barest outlines of this procedure,
with little hint as to its development from 1066 until 1485, the year of the
accession of Henry Tudor.108 There were two basic methods of starting a
criminal trial in the Middle Ages, indictment by a grand jury and the filing
of a complaint, known as an appeal, by the injured party. The second pro-
cedure is said to be the less common, and it is true that Parliament discouraged
and finally forbade it in minor cases. 10 9 The Yearbooks of the fourteenth and
fifteenth centuries indicate, however, that the felony appeal was by no means
uncommon. 110 On the other hand, the eyres, which were responsible for calling
the grand juries, were held at infrequent intervals,"' though many indict-
ments were returned when eyres were held. Thus, the appeal was a criminal
proceeding more regularly available than the indictment. In the case of murder,
at least, the appeal was the common and preferred method of proceeding."12
There are gaps in our knowledge as to exactly how the system worked. There
were, for example, Commissions of Gaol Delivery 113 which empowered justices
to go about the counties two or three times a year and hear the cases of all
who were in gaol. Those who were in gaol were those who had been caught
red-handed either by the sheriff, by the justice of the peace or by private
107. See Leges, 49, 2(a), in LIEBERMANN, op. cit. supra note 99, at 572.
108. See generally 1 STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND
244-72 (1883) [hereinafter cited as STEPHEN]; 3 HOLDSWORTH, HiSTORy oF ENGLISH
LAW 607-20 (1936 ed.).
109. An Act Against Murderers, 1487, 3 Hen. 7, c. 2, demotes appeals from their pre-
ferred status since the parties had been slow in perfecting their appeals.
110. See, e.g., Anon., Y.B. 2 Edw. 2 (1309), p. 42 (Selden Soc. ed. 1903); Tayleur
v. Asshyndon, 6 & 7 Edw. 2 (1313), in 1 THE EYRE oF KENT 113-14 (Selden Soc. ed.
1909); Athern v. Bigg, Y.B. 1 Hen. 6 (1422), pp. 1-10 (Selden Soc. ed. 1933).
111. 1 STEPHEN 103-04.
112. See note 109 supra and accompanying text.
113. 1 STEPHEN 105.
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parties; it is unclear whether there was any need for an indictment if a man
had been arrested.
Once a man was before the court, whether by indictment or appeal, the
charge was read to him." 4 In a trial under indictment, he was then called
upon to plead to the charge, to challenge the jury, to challenge the indictment
on legal grounds, or to plead autrefois acquit, autrefois convict, or pardon.
He might also at this time make a plea of clergy. It appears that a more limited
range of these initial pleas was customary in appeals cases. After the initial
plea the two forms of trial appear to have had more similarities. The law per-
mitted the pleading of exceptions to the indictment or the appeal, and, although
pleading was not as complicated as the pleading to a civil complaint, it was
around the pleading of these exceptions that the complexities of the criminal
law arose. There was little presentation of evidence as we know it.115 The
earlier Middle Ages recognized the ordeal as a method for obtaining the
truth, and, in appeals cases, trials by battle were the rule. In the felony indict-
ment, however, the petit jury was used increasingly as a body of fact-finders.
When the legal issues in the indictment had been defined, the judge would
turn to the jury and, perhaps after brief argument by the parties, ask them
to find on the factual issues raised. 6
It is clear that the mediaeval courts permitted and even appointed a pleader
in appeals cases. 117 Thus at the most critical moment in the appeals trial, the
pleading, the accused had assistance. It is less clear whether attorneys were
permitted in appeals cases. Britton Is several times denies it though the lan-
guage of the Statute of Westminster 11 seems broad enough to include it.
As to the defensor or the advocatus, it would seem that the role of this person
in the literal sense - as the champion who fought the trial by battle - con-
tinued; all manner of people were involved in appeals suits, including widows,
clerks and others who clearly could not themselves engage in trial by combat.12 0
None of the great mediaeval treatises on the common lav specifically men-
tion legal assistance in any form in the felony trial under indictment. From
this it might be inferred that there was no assistance in these trials. But the
contrary seems the better inference. Fortescue, in the mid-fifteenth century,
says that
each of the parties, by themselves or their Counsel, 121 in presence of the
Court, shall declare and lay open to the Jury all and singular the matters
114. See generally id. at 297-301; 3 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 108, at 610-20.
115. 1 STEPHEN 258-59.
116. See Hugo's case, Y.B. 30 & 31 Edw. 1 (1303) reported in 1 STEPHEN 261-62.
117. See SAINT GERMAN, DOCTOR & STUDENT 256-59 (Muchall ed. 1874); STAN-
FORD, LEs PLEES DEL CORON 151 (1560).
118. BRITTON, TREATISE 84 (Nichol's transl. 1901).
119. Statute of Westminster, the Second, 1285, 13 Edw. 1, c. 10.
120. E.g., Anon., Y.B. 2 Edw. 2 (1309), p. 42 (Selden Soc. ed. 1903) ; Tayleur v.
Asshyndon, 6 & 7 Edw. 2 (1313) in 1 THE EYRE or KENT 113-14 (Selden Soc. ed. 1909);
BRITroN, op. cit. supra note 118, 91 n.1.
121. By this time the word was used in its modern sense meaning any kind of rep-
resentation.
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and evidences, whereby they think they may be able to inform the Court
concerning the truth of the point in question.1 22
He does not mention felony cases on indictment as an exception to this rule.
Besides, the mediaeval works are not altogether silent. The Mirror of Justices
says:
[B]ecause folk do not generally know all the "exceptions" which can
be used by way of answer, pleaders [countours] are necessary who know
how to set forth causes and to defend them according to the rules of law
and the usage of the realm, and they are the more necessary for the de-
fence in indictments and appeals of felony than in venial causes.'2
There are many points on which the Mirror is untrustworthy, but the points
on which the author disagrees with his contemporaries are usually points of
constitutional law, points of basic principle, while on matters of procedure
he is 'most often reliable.12 4 The Yearbooks are unusually silent on the topic
of counsel, though there is one case in which the accused is denied the oppor-
tunity to go out and bring in consilium in the old Anglo-Saxon fashion. 125 On
the other hand, we find in an appeal case of the late thirteenth century the
appearance of 'bne Herle, apparently the first specialized criminal defense
lawyer, who "defended all manner of felony, assault, waylaying and all that
is against the King's peace, his crown and dignity."'2
From these historical scraps we can draw some tentative conclusions as to
the nature of representation in mediaeval criminal procedure. Though there
was some feeling that a trial in which the interest of the state is involved
should not be swayed by the pressure of a flock of the defendant's friends
and that the defendant himself must be present and answer the charges, there
were many places during appeals trials and some during indictment trials
where he' could receive legal assistance. The primary place in the trial at
which he needed such assistance was at the pleading of exceptions. The pre-
sentation of the case as we know it was unknown then; witnesses do not appear
at civil trials until the mid-fifteenth century, and the date of their appearance
in criminal trials is uncertain.1 7
After presentation of factual evidence by witnesses became prevalent, some-
time between the mid-fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, a curious distinction
developed in the law of counsel. Vhile the defendant might employ counsel
in pleading matters of law, counsel could not assist in the demonstration of
fact. It is unclear whether the restraint was present from the start, or developed
some time after witnesses were introduced into the trial. Authors of the modem
histories assume that the law of counsel of the late seventeenth century, that
122. FORTESCUE, COMMENDATION Or THE LAWs OF ENGLAND 41 (Grigor trans].
1917).
123. HoRN, THE MIRROR OF JusTIcEs 90 (Selden Soc. ed. 1895).
124. See Introduction in id. at ix-lv.
125. Hugo's Case, Y.B. 30 & 31 Edw. 1 (1303) reported in 1 STEP1EN 261.
126. Anon., 2 Edw. 2 (1309), p. 42 (Selden Soc. ed. 1903).
127. 1 STEPHEN 263.
1022 [Vol. 73 : 1000
COUNSEL AT INTERROGATION
counsel might be had for "questions of law" only, applied from the very be-
ginning of the presentation of evidence. Yet the state trials of the fifteenth
and early sixteenth century are sparse and the Yearbooks are silent on the
topic. There is at least some basis for an inference that the introduction of
witnesses preceded development of the rule. Stephen believed witnesses to
have been introduced into criminal actions by the middle of the fifteenth cen-
tury.12 8 Yet St. Germain, writing in the early sixteenth century, does not
mention the rule denying counsel for matters of fact in felony trials, while
Stanford,'12 9 writing in the third quarter of the same century, does mention
the rule. By the time of Coke the rule restricting counsel to matters of law is
so well established that he does not seek to question that it has always been
thus.
Dating the rule from the mid-sixteenth century makes some sense since
that was the time the right to counsel was abolished in France ' 30 and many
Roman law procedures were introduced into England.13 1 Furthermore, it is
difficult to understand how Fortescue and St. Germain could have ignored
the rule, had it developed in the mid-fifteenth century. What seems especially
persuasive for dating the rule after the introduction of witnesses is the dis-
tinction it draws between felony cases and misdemeanors: only in felony cases
was counsel barred from assisting in the preparation of facts.' 32 Such a dis-
tinction is difficult to explain as deriving from the innovation in evidentiary
practice; on the other hand, it may be reconciled with a notion that the felony
defendant was not to be protected since he posed a greater danger to the
state. Sir John Hawles, Solicitor-General of England at the end of the seven-
teenth century, describes the development of the doctrine in a manner sug-
gesting the correctness of this analysis. He finds the rule's source in mistaken
judicial practice which after long use had attained the "colour of a law.' 3 3
In the presence of the mediaeval doctrine denying the defendant consilium
and at the same time allowing him a pleader, it is easy to see how the frag-
mentation of consilium into what we now know as witnesses, jurors, and
bondsmen resulted in confusion as to the meaning of the early rule against
128. Id. at 264-65.
129. STANFORD, op. cit. supra note 117, at 151. Stanford's chapter on evidence, id. at
163-64, does not make it clear whether the defendant could put forward any evidence.
Counsel, Stanford says, should be denied on pleas of not guilty because the defendant
kmows the facts better than counsel and presentation of the facts by counsel would con
fuse the issues with learning. He mentions, however, that counsel may appear as amicus
curiae to inform the court that it errs in a question of law and also that the defendant
may have counsel to argue special pleas, such as a plea of sanctuary.
130. See Rackow, supra note 97, at 1 & n.1; Ploscowe, The Development of Present-
Day Criminal Procedures in Europe and America, 48 HARV. L. Rnv. 433, 449-52 (1935).
131. See Ploscowe, supra note 130; Pound, The Future of the Criminal Law, 21
COLUm. L. REv. (1921); 9 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAV 223-29 (1922 ed.).
132. 4 BLACKSTONE, COmmENTARIES *355 (1899). See Rosewell's Case, 3 STATE
TRIALS 909, 963 (2d ed. 1730) [hereinafter cited as St. Tr.] (statement of Lord Jeffreys).
133. 4 St. Tr. 165, 174.
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consilium. Since what was finally left of the consilium became the modem
counsel, 134 the rule could easily have been interpreted to mean that legal as-
sistance was to be denied the defendant. There was, however, a check on this
tendency in the rule that the accused could employ the assistance of a pleader.
Thus in the old legal questions, those of pleading, the accused could still have
legal assistance, but he was denied such assistance at the newer part of the
trial, the presentation of evidence, because of a misunderstanding of the gen-
eral protective function of consilium. Such a misunderstanding could have
arisen in the practice of individual trial judges 135 and could have achieved
the status of an absolute rule as the pressure towards maximizing the state's
interests became greater as the sixteenth century moved on.
Whatever its origin, by the time of Coke the rule was that the accused must
plead to the indictment and make his defense as to the facts without the aid
of counsel. In matters of law, however, the defendant might use counsel to
aid him.' 36 Coke gives two reasons why the accused may not have counsel
for matters of fact:
First, that the testimonies and the proofs of the offense ought to be so
clear and manifest, as there can be no defense of it. Secondly, the court
ought to be in stead of councell for the prisoner, to see that nothing be
urged against him contrary to law and right; nay, any learned man that
is present may inform the court for the benefit of the prisoner....137
Later he adds a third reason:
Where any person is indicted of treason or felony, and pleadeth to the
treason or felony, not guilty, which goeth to the fact best known to the
party; it is holden that the party in that case shall have no councell to
give in evidence, or alleage any matter for him; but for as much as
ex facto jus oritur it is necessary to be explained, what matters upon his
arraignment, or after not guilty pleaded, he may alleage for his defence,
and pray councell learned to utter the same in forme of law.138
In a system in which the presentation of proof was highly informal, this di-
vision might well not be thought too prejudicial to the defendant. The defen-
dant presents the facts peculiarly within his knowledge, and his counsel pleads
the law, arguing how it applies to the facts. Coke has a notion that anything
that the defendant can present to negate the prosecution's case should be suffi-
cient to acquit, so that the defense case need not be presented with much art,
134. Attornatis is not the ancestor of modem counsel since attornatus did not be-
come professionalized. See generally COHEN, op. cit. supra note 101, at 126-43.
135. E.g., Anon., Y.B. Pasch. 9 Edw. 4, f.2, pl. 4, (1496), the first, so far as the author
knows, mention of the rule, in a note in an appeals case: "Et nota, q le def. en enditement
de felony n'avera counsel vers le Roy s'il me soit natter en ley: Mes en appeal auter est,
&c."
136. On Coke's passages about counsel see Heidelbaugh & Becker, Benefit by Coun-
sel in Criminal Cases in the Time of Coke, 6 MIAmI L.Q. 546 (1952). It is interesting
to compare Coke's passage with Stanford's, supra note 129, for Coke seems to draw much
from Stanford's compressed account.
137. 3 CoxE, INSTTUTES 29 (1817) [hereinafter cited as CoE].
138. 3 CoKE 136. The tag means "law rises out of fact."
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and, secondly, Coke pictures the judge as an impartial figure who sees that
everything is done according to law. These two reasons are not true rationales
but rather excuses which tend to show that the system can be made tolerable
for the defendant by the presence of other checks in his favor.
It is questionable whether even in Coke's time the system offered sufficient
protections to the defendant. Coke itemizes six kinds of arguments which
counsel ought to be allowed to make: that the indictment does not allege facts
which constitute a crime under the law; that a statute has been misapplied
or has fallen into desuetude; that the indictment was not drawn upon suffi-
cient evidence; that the indictment is fatal for vagueness or that the act alleged
has been pardoned; that the state's case is not proved by the requisite number
of witnesses; and that the court has no jurisdiction. The burden seems to be
on the defendant to raise questions of law before he can have counsel: "For
it is to be observed, that in no case the party arraigned of treason or felony,
can pray councell learned generally, but must shew some cause." 13 9 On the
other hand this sentence may simply refer to the assignment of counsel and
to the granting of permission for the counsel to argue the matter before the
court. Later Coke says, "And that the prisoner may alleage these or the like
matters, it is evident, because for every matter in law rising upon the fact,
the prisoner shall have councell learned assigned to him."1 40 There is nothing
in Coke to lead us to believe that the accused might not bring his counsel into
Court and have him ready should any questions of law arise, and indeed he
says, "Also it is lawfull for any man that is in court, to informe the court
of any of these matters, lest the court should erre, and the prisoner unjustly
for his life proceeded with."' 41 Coke's picture of the function of counsel, then,
shows that he does not conceive of a trial without counsel, such as Betts had,
but a trial in which counsel's role was limited to the presentation of arguments
of law. Ostensibly, this is the rule which is followed until the middle of the
eighteenth century. There was, however, great variety in the practice of these
hundred and fifty years, a variety founded on a confusion about what are
matters of law and what matters of fact.
The system which we see described in Coke is certainly no improvement
over the mediaeval one from the point of view of the defendant; on the other
hand, it is not grossly overbalanced on the side of the state. In Coke's time,
his excuses may have carried some weight. Whatever the standard of judicial
impartiality in Coke's day and whatever may have been the quantum of proof
necessary for conviction, however, these checks rapidly declined in the years
following Coke's death. In their absence the fact-law distinction became a
method for forcing men on trial for their lives to stand alone against the
state. The difficulty with Coke's system was that the rights of the defendant
were not sufficiently secured in law; they were too vague to withstand the
139. Ibid.
140. Id. at 137.
141. Ibid.
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hysterical pressures which the treason trials of the seventeenth century
brought to bear on them. The denial of counsel as to matters of fact and the
haziness of the distinction between matters of fact and matters of law con-
tributed to this most appalling chapter in the history of English criminal
law. Full accounts of the state trials of the seventeenth century have been
written elsewhere and so much invective has been poured out upon the
procedures by which they were conducted that it seems of little use to rehearse
either the accounts or the invective. 142 Let us simply point out how the right
to counsel is cramped and confined from what it was in Coke's day until it
almost disappears.
In Raleigh's Case (1603) 143 Lord Coke himself was party to a proceeding
in which the court, rather than being counsel for the prisoner, abused him in
the most violent language, and did not assign him counsel to argue the statu-
tory question of whether the two-witness requirement had been met. In Lil-
burne's Case (1649) 144 the accused asked for counsel to challenge the indict-
ment on the grounds that it had not been properly found by the court of oyer
and terminer which also was trying him. The court refused to grant him coun-
sel on the ground that the question was not one of law. In Love's Case (1651) 145
the defendant wished to have counsel for challenging the indictment but was
forced to plead first. Such a practice is not envisaged by Coke, who said the
challenges to the indictment must come before the plea. In the trial of Viscount
Stafford (1680)146 the defendant was denied counsel to argue the point that
treasonable acts must be proven by two witnesses. This is in direct violation
of Coke's fifth exception. In Fitz-Harris' Case (1681)147 and Colledge's Case
(1681)148 the defendants were not allowed to make use of papers which had
been prepared by their counsel before the trial began. In the latter case, the
papers - which contained Colledge's defense - were seized by the prosecu-
tion before the trial and used to the state's advantage. In Russel's Case
(1683)149 the defendant was denied counsel first on the question of whether
hearsay was admissible and once again on whether the statute under which
he was being tried covered the acts alleged. On the first matter, the court said
that it was a question of fact and not of law; as to the second, it held that the
accused would have to admit the fact before the applicability of the law could
be called into question. Here is a clear violation of Coke's second exception.
This strict attitude survived the accession to the throne of William and
Mary. In the trial of Ashton and Elliot 110 for treason, Ashton was denied
142. For the former see 1 STEPHEN 319-428; for the latter see Douglas, A Challenge
to the Bar, 28 NOTRE D.mE LAw. 497 (1953).
143. 1 St. Tr. 205 (1603).
144. 2 St. Tr. 19, 35-36, 39 (1649).
145. 2 St. Tr. 83, 87-88 (1651).
146. 3 St. Tr. 102, 122, 208 (1680).
147. 3 St. Tr. 261, 261-62 (1681).
148. 3 St. Tr. 342, 343-52 (1681). See 4 St. Tr. at 174-76 (Hawles' remarks on this
proceeding).
149. 3 St. Tr. 629, 629-30, 645 (1683).
150. 4 St. Tr. 409, 416 (1690).
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counsel to debate the point of whether he might see a copy of the indictment;
in Parkyns' Case (1695) 151 the defendant was denied counsel although the
act of Parliament permitting it was to go into effect the next day. Concerning
the theory that the court was counsel for the accused, the last words of Lady
Alice Lisle are perhaps the best commentary:
I have been told, the Court ought to be Counsel for the Prisoner, instead
of which, there was Evidence given from thence; which, though it were
but Hearsay, might possibly affect my Jury. My Defence was such as
might be expected from a weak Woman; but such as it was, I did not
hear it repeated again to the Jury.152
In 1695 Parliament passed the celebrated act "for regulating of trials in
cases of treason and misprison of treason.' ' 5 3 This act provided, among other
things, that the accused was to have counsel in cases of treason for both mat-
ters of law and fact and that if he could not afford counsel, the court was to
appoint it for him. The effect of this act may be seen in the trial of Charles
Cranburne (1696) ,1 in which counsel made many objections to the indict-
ment and conducted a vigorous cross-examination of the state's witnesses.
Although this act applied only to trials for treason, it betokened an eighteenth
century trend toward mollification of the rigors of the seventeenth century
felony rule. Thus, in the trial of Captain Kidd (1701)1 55 the defendant had
counsel assigned to him only for matters of law, but the assignment was made
just after he had pleaded. By the middle of the eighteenth century a rule
seems to have arisen by which "questions of law" were extended to include
both direct and cross-examination. The origin of this rule seems to have
been in the notion that counsel could examine witnesses on what was regarded
as a collateral issue. Thus on the trial of a collateral issue, Ratcliffe (1746)156
had counsel who both cross-examined the King's witnesses and observed fully
upon the evidence. Lovat's Case (1747)157 is the last major case in which the
court did not allow counsel to examine witnesses. In the trials of Mary Blandy
(1752),'"~ John Barbot (1753), 159 and William Barnard (1758)160 counsel
for the defendants were allowed to examine the witnesses, though in the trial of
Barbot the defendant had to protest vigorously before counsel was allowed
at all; once counsel was in, the judge's interpretation of "points of law" seemed
to include the questioning of witnesses. It was not until 1836 that all dis-
tinctions between facts and law were abolished by statute and a full defense
151. 4 St. Tr. 615, 618-19 (1695).
152. 4 St. Tr. 117, 130 (1685).
153. The Treason Act, 1695, 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 3.
154. 4 St. Tr. 686 (1696).
155. 5 St. Tr. 287, 287-88 (1701).
156. 18 STATE TR ALS 430, 434-35 (1746) (Howell ed. 1816) [hereinafter cited as
How. St. Tr.].
157. 18 How. St. Tr. 529, 578-79 (1747).
158. 18 How. St. Tr. 1118 (1752).
159. 18 How. St. Tr. 1230, 1231 (1753).
160. 19 How. St. Tr. 815, 826, 828-31 (1758).
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was guaranteed to all accused of felony.'161 It would seem, however, that this
act was but legislative confirmation of what had been the best judicial practice
for almost 75 years.
What is especially significant about the common law of counsel is the ap-
pearance of some sort of right to counsel during the pre-trial period. In mod-
em trials, the right to counsel has been extended back on the grounds that
early consultation is needed to develop adequate defenses during the trial
stage of the proceeding.1 2 But in an earlier system, when counsel's role at
trial was confined to matters of law, it might be expected that pre-trial prepa-
ration and consultation would be seriously limited. Surprisingly, even in the
1680's counsel was regularly allowed to see the prisoner in advance of trial.
Lord William Russel had counsel while he was in the Tower.103 Even Colledge
and Fitz-Harris must have had counsel while in prison, else the problem of
their using papers drawn up by counsel never would have arisen.0 4 Sir John
Hawles, expressing his disapproval that Colledge and Fitz-Harris in the Plot
trials had their papers seized, states that not only was the prisoner regularly
allowed to see counsel but that he also was allowed to see his friends and hire
a solicitor to investigate the factual side of his case.165 It is hard to say whether
such consultation was a matter of right or a matter of grace on the part of
the gaoler. In Love's Case the court thought it necessary to order the gaoler
to grant Love's counsel access to him at all seasonable times, and after the
passage of the Treason Act of 1695 similar orders were issued allowing the
prisoner access to counsel and friends.167 On the one hand, such orders may
be the first evidence of judicial reaction to a traditional gaoler practice of
denying prisoners access to counsel; on the other, they may be a judicial en-
forcement of long-standing practices against newly recalcitrant gaolers. It is
unfortunate that treason cases are the only ones which deal specifically with
this problem since there seems to have been a strict doctrine making anyone
who aided a man charged with treason also liable to punishment for treason.0 8
But Hawles' argument that this doctrine should not apply to legal advice
indicates that gaolers in the normal run of cases permitted early consultation.
From the treason cases as well as from other evidence another facet of
the general availability of counsel emerges. Like the implication in Gideon
some 400 years later, there was no distinction at common law between retained
and appointed counsel. 169 Whether or not a man should have counsel de-
pended not on ability to pay, but on whether a point of law arose. In treason
161. Trials for Felony Act, 1836, 687 Will. 4, c. 114, § 1.
162. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
163. 3 St. Tr. 629, 630 (1683).
164. See 4 St. Tr. at 174 (Hawles' remarks).
165. Id. at 174-75.
167. See Rookwood's Case 4 St. Tr. 649, 650 (1696) ; Ratcliffe's Case 9 St. Tr. 582
(1746); Lovat's Case 18 How. St. Tr. 529, 532 (1747).
168. 4 St. Tr. at 174-75.
169. See text at note 140 supra for Coke's use of "assignment."
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cases, counsel was always described as "assigned" counsel. By this device
he could avoid the taint of "treason by association": he was serving the court,
not the prisoner. Of course, what is referred to as "assigned" counsel, in
some cases quite obviously had been previously retained and were simply
waiting for the formality of appointment; at other times, however, it appears
as if the defendant came into court without counsel and the court assigned
counsel from the members of the bar present.170 Hawles says that the rule
denying all prisoners charged with a felony the right to counsel arose because
so many poverty-striken felony defendants appeared without counsel. 171 His
assumptions about the past role of appointed counsel are questionable; periodic
references are made in even the earliest cases to assignment of counsel. And
the form of his statement at least suggests that he could not conceive of a
situation in which the size of a man's purse governed whether he had counsel
or not. Furthermore, Hawles was reflecting on conditions in criminal cases
prior to his time. By the middle of the eighteenth century the courts clearly
were appointing counsel for indigent and unpopular 172 defendants. In the
trial of McDaniel (1755) 173 counsel prefaced his argument by saying: ". . . I
could not have been prevailed upon to have been counsel for such a set of
rogues, had I not been appointed by your lordships." Like the allowing of
counsel in felony cases for matters of fact, the appointment of counsel did
not become a matter of legislative concern until long after it became a judicial
practice.174 The early practice of assigning counsel seems to indicate that in
the limited area in which the courts were allowing counsel at all, counsel
was a right, not merely a privilege, and that it was the duty of the court to
see that a man got counsel, at least for legal questions.
This brief history of the right to counsel in English common law is sig-
nificant in its revelation of a much richer and older law of counsel than justice
Roberts would have us believe existed. Such a short account, however, in-
variably raises difficult questions concerning the basic nature of the early
English criminal proceeding, questions which cannot be answered here. One
might make quite a valid objection to any criminal law history which relies
170. Compare Kidd's Case 5 St. Tr. 287, 287-88 (1701), with Sidney's Case 3 St. Tr.
710, 738 (1683) and Love's Case 2 St. Tr. 83, 88 (1651).
171. 4 St. Tr. at 174.
172. See BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO CouNsEL IN AmEmCAN CouRTs 10 (1955).
173. 19 How. St. Tr. 745, 790 (1755).
174. The Poor Prisoners' Defence Act, 1903, 3 Edw. 7, c. 38, § 1, authorized the
appointment of counsel in cases where justice required it. This act simply confirmed the
existing practice and may even have had the effect of limiting the appointment of coun-
sel. The Poor Prisoners' Defence Act, 1930, 20 & 21 Geo. 5, c. 32, § 1(3) (a), made the
appointment mandatory for murder; this act, too, proved unsatisfactory since the judges
seemed to act in adherence more to the letter of the law than to its spirit. The Legal
Aid and Advice Act, 1949, 12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 51, modified the previous acts somewhat
but it may be said that at this date the appointment of counsel in felony cases is not as
certain in England as it is in the United States since Gideon,. See BEANEY, op. ct. supra
note 172, at 12-14.
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heavily on the state trials, the causes cRbres of the day, as examples. The
defense to this methodological charge is one of necessity - the state trials
are the only full trial records surviving from the time, and they give a better
picture of the criminal process than no records at all. Then too, it may be a
mistake to say that since famous men were involved in these trials, one must
assume that the average felon got even less of a hearing. We have often seen
how the notoriety of a case may result in a lack of consideration of procedural
safeguards ;175 it is possible that where public opinion was less involved and
where the interest of the state was less at stake, there was more consideration
paid to the person of the defendant. This opinion is reinforced by Sir John
Hawles' writings on the trials of the Popish Plot; he attacks the refusal to
allow some defendants to see their lawyers as contrary to the usual practice
in a felony case.
17 6
The Right to Counsel in the American Colonies
The variety in the colonial statutes and provisions on the right to counsel
(see the Appendix) might suggest that the colonists did not regard the right
as fundamental. On balance, however, the inference seems a dubious one. In
England, the right was judicially enforced; except for the treason statute
there were no English statutory provisions regarding counsel until 1836.
Assuming the colonies to have followed the same pattern, it would be im-
possible to tell how much real variation there was between the colonies in
the absence of a thorough study of the practice in the colonial courts. Then
too, this was a time of flux in the right to counsel in England itself. The old
distinction between facts and law was being abolished and courts were show-
ing some tendency to appoint counsel for the undefended for the entire period
of the trial rather than just for specific points of law.17 Some clues are
available, moreover, from the colonial legislation. Connecticut (17??), Penn-
sylvania (1718), Delaware (1719), South Carolina (1731), and perhaps
New York (1777) all had provisions requiring the appointment of counsel
in felony cases.178 By 1789, the year in which the sixth amendment was
proposed in Congress, every state except Rhode Island and Georgia had
some provision regarding the right to counsel. The wording of the provisions
seems to differ according to geographical area, but eleven of the states had
either directly or impliedly abolished the fact-law distinction :179 New Hamp-
shire, Vermont, and Massachusetts word it in terms of a "full hearing";
New York in terms of allowance of counsel "as in civil actions"; Delaware,
Pennsylvania and New Jersey in terms of giving the defendant the same
right to counsel as his prosecutor; North Carolina specifically grants the
175. See Sauvage, The Oswald Affair, Commentary, Mar. 1964, p. 55; 1 STEPHEN
at 345.
176. 4 St. Tr. at 174.
177. See BEAxY, op. cit. supra note 172, at 22-24.
178. See Appendix.
179. See Appendix.
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right "as well as to facts as to law" and, according to Swift, Connecticut had
the same provisions; South Carolina speaks of a "full defense" by counsel.
By 1800 New Jersey had included a right to appointed counsel in its con-
stitution, Rhode Island had passed a statute similar to the sixth amendment,
and Georgia had a provision allowing counsel to advocate or defend the cause
of an accused. One need not assume that when these provisions were enacted
that they represented a great innovation in actual judicial practice of the state.
It was against this background that the sixth amendment was adopted.
Virginia, which never had a guaranty of right to counsel in its own constitu-
tion, was the first state to propose the right for inclusion in a federal bill
of rights. North Carolina also had the provision in its suggested bill, and
New York included it in the assumed rights upon which it conditionally rati-
fied the Constitution. Madison proposed the present sixth amendment in the
House on July 2, 1789, and it passed both Houses almost without debate. It
was ratified in late 1791.180 The Framers seem to have intended it to be an
assurance that rights would not be denied again during a period of judicial
hysteria as they had been in seventeenth century England.
From 1791 until 1932 state and federal courts saw practically no cases on
the right to counsel. 181 At the turn of the century as American society became
more urbanized, the problem of the indigent and friendless defendant came
more and more before the courts. The state courts developed various uniform
policies to replace the helter-skelter of individual decisions in the area, some
of which policies were not calculated to see that the indigent were well rep-
resented.8 2 In the 'twenties with the increasing national awareness of crime,
a public callousness to the defendant's rights developed ;183 that it arose may
suggest an insufficient realization that the first to suffer from a diminution
of rights is not the professional gangster but the casual criminal or the inno-
cent. Within this setting the Scotsboro Cases came to the national attention
and prompted the Supreme Court's awakening to the issue of counsel in
Powell v. Alabama.184
The History Siuninarized
These, then, are the random incidents providing the historical basis for a
contemporary meaning for the right to counsel. What remains is the need to
180. For the legislative history of the sixth amendment see Rackow, The Right to
Counsel: English and American Precedents, 11 WM. & MARY QUART. 1, 21-26 (3d ser.
1954) and authorities cited therein.
181. There is the famous dictum of Justice Brown in Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S.
366, 386 (1898), pointing out how much better American procedure is than, English con-
cerning the right to counsel, and there is the case of Andersen v. Treat, 172 U.S. 24
(1898), in which the Court approved the appointment of counsel by the lower court in a
complex case involving conflict of interest. See also Taney, C.J., in United States v. Reid,
53 U.S. (12 How.) 361, 364 (1851).
182. See BEA-EY, op. cit. supra note 172, at 80-94.
183. See Pound, mspra note 131, at 13-14.
184. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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integrate the experience of the past into the problems of the present. If, in
some sense, the "nature" of the right to counsel can be understood, its appli-
cation in new contexts can be determined. One thing can be said with cer-
tainty: the right to counsel was, at least in some form, one of the basic and
continuing procedural rights of criminal defendants in the common law. Not
until the sixteenth century, when many foreign elements were introduced
into the criminal procedure of England and absolutist notions of the state
came into vogue, was the right to counsel kept from expanding, by the facts-
law distinction. Even then, it was always understood that the right to counsel,
within its limited range, was absolute. In the middle of the most restrictive
period Sir Francis Winnington could say: "This Lord being accused of
High-Treason, the allowing of Council is not a matter of discretion. If matters
of law arise, all our books say that Council ought to be allowed.. ."185 Another
lesson equally important is that when the right to counsel was not expanded
to meet the increased scope of trial, fundamental unfairness to the accused
resulted. Lord Russel and Lady Alice Lisle were convicted on hearsay. In
the trial of Langhorn for treason, the testimony of Titus Oates could have
been destroyed by any skillful cross-examination. This is a particularly strik-
ing example of the absolute necessity of counsel, for Langhorn was himself
a barrister. 8 6
What is particularly striking in this development is the manner in which
the extent of the right to counsel fluctuates. It is commonly assumed that
throughout history there has been a trend toward giving the defendant more
rights, taking more and more power from the state. Under this theory, society
has been able to afford its dispensation because the state has become increas-
ingly powerful and its position less precarious. 8 7 Underlying the theory is
the caveat that if individual rights outrun the increasing stability of the state,
society would be swamped by a wave of crime. If the records of the seven-
teenth century state trials are compared with any modern criminal record,
the hypothesis is vindicated. But one swallow does not a summer make: the
history of a trend is falsified by relying on so drastic and simple a juxtapo-
sition. In fact, the measure of the right to counsel has not been the amount
of power a given society can "afford to grant." The rights of the defendant
seem to run in cycles not according to the amount of power the government
actually has but the amount it wants to have.188
The right to counsel, then, is not a recent grant of largess by society but
an old right which has never completely faded in the face of severe opposition.
185. Stafford's Case, 3 St. Tr. 101, 122 (1680).
186. 2 St. Tr. 874 (1679). Langhorn, for example, failed to cross-examine Oates on
the arrangement of his chambers when such cross-examination vould have proven that
Oates had never seen the chambers. Once again the adage was proven, "He who defends
himself has a fool for a client and an ass for a lawyer."
187. See generally 1 STEPHEN 354-57; 3 HoLswoRTH, HSTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
607-23 (1936 ed.) ; Heidelbaugh & Becker, supra note 136, at 547.
188. To the same effect see Pound, supra note 131, at 9-10.
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Records of persons serving counsel's function occur at an early date. As the
state's concern for its power increased in Tudor times and as evidence was
introduced into criminal trials, there arose the notion that one could have
assistance only for the technicalities and not for matters of fact. This notion
became more and more dominant until in the time of the Stuarts, matters
of law were defined so narrowly that the accused stood against the state
practically without aid. When the state's concern for its power declined during
the Hanoverian times, and England was ruled by the dual theories of "quieta
non viovere" and "every man has his price," the right to counsel was revived,
the facts-law distinction was virtually abandoned, and extensive appointments
of counsel were made for the indigent. This pattern is reflected in the United
States also; the right was formulated by the weak colonial governments, ran
its gravest risk of extinction during the crime wave of the 'twenties, was re-
vived by the Supreme Court in the 'thirties, and has been most stringently ap-
plied during the crime wave of the 'fifties and early 'sixties.
There is yet another myth concerning the growth of the right to counsel:
that increased use of counsel has been sparked only by the rising com-
plexity of trials, the proliferation of the rules of evidence, and the com-
plicating factors of mens rea and the insanity defense.'8 9 In the early English
procedure, when there was no presentation of evidence and the essential
points in the process in which the individual stood up against his accusers
were the pleading, the argument, and the trial by battle, the accused, as far
as we can see, was allowed to have counsel for all three critical points. It
was not until the sixteenth century that there developed a notion that
counsel need not be present for all the critical points of confrontation in the
trial process. The avowed purpose of the facts-law distinction, which saw
its most restrictive elaboration then, was to divide technicalities of law from
matters of fact and to give the accused the aid of counsel only for the former
- the sole aspect in which it was thought that he needed it. The rule proved
highly unsatisfactory; it was discovered that the defendant's technical incom-
petence was not the only reason why he could not conduct his own defense,
and that under the pressure of trial the defendant was simply incapable of
conducting any defense. This restricted notion of counsel was not the one
which the colonists adopted in the United States. Though the colonial pro-
visions about counsel were in accord on few things, they agreed on the ne-
cessity of abolishing the facts-law distinction;190 the colonists appreciated
that if a defendant were forced to stand alone against the state, his case was
189. Cf. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932) ; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 462-66 (1938) :
[The Sixth Amendment] embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth
that the average defendant does not have the professional skill to protect himself
when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty . . . That
which is simple, orderly and necessary to the lawyer, to the untrained layman may
appear intricate, complex and mysterious.
190. See text at notes 178-79 supra.
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foredoomed. The introduction of evidence into the criminal trial had created
a new point of confrontation between the state and the individual, and under
an adversary system of criminal justice, the accused must have the buffer
of counsel between himself and the force of the state at all such points. Indeed
counsel at trial may be said to have been the cause of the complicating factors.
The hearsay rule was known only in its crudest form until the late eighteenth
century; the thirty-one exceptions 191 are products of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. 92 The M'Naughton rule,'193 the first rational statement
of the insanity defense, comes in the early nineteenth century. Until we have
counsel present at a particular stage in the criminal process the effective
formulation of legal rules is impossible; the presence of counsel in the trials
of the middle and late eighteenth century made the reforms of the early
nineteenth century possible.
THE INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS
Counsel, then, has been more than a technical aid; he has served to over-
come the original unfairness of the balance of state against individual. His-
torically, this role has been played mainly at trial - the focus of confronta-
tion. If, however, a critical confrontation occurs at the earlier investigative
stage of the process, we might have to alter our conception of the role counsel
must play to readjust the balance.
Criminal investigation by the police, with its concomitant of police interro-
gation, is a product of the late nineteenth century.1 94 This does not mean
that in the past no crimes were investigated or that no one was interrogated,
but investigation was not a function of the police.' 95 There have always been
police of one sort or another, but they were charged with guarding against
crime and arresting known offenders and not with the ferreting out of offend-
ers.' 96 In mediaeval England there were a few constables in every parish and
watchmen in every town. These men were not expected to do the guarding
by themselves; every man was required by law to keep arms 197 so that when
the constable or watchman raised the hue and cry, the discovered criminal
might be pursued. Though peace officers might arrest any man whom they
suspected on reasonable grounds of having committed a felony, this power
does not seem to have been exercised nearly so frequently as their power
to arrest for a felony if it had been committed in their presence or to arrest
for a misdemeanor which was committed in their presence and which in-
191. So enumerated in the UNIFOPR RULES OF EVID.EXCE.
192. See 5 WIGMoRE, EVlDENCE §§ 1420-27 (9th ed. 1940).
193. M'Naughton's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
194. See note 235 infra and accompanying text.
195. See HowARD, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN ENGLAND 581-83 (1931).
196. See 1 RADZINoWIcz, HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW 28-31 (1948); 1
STEPHEN 194-96; MAITLAND, JUSTICE AND POLICE 105-08 (1885).
197. Assize of Arms (1181), in, STUBBS, SELECT CHARTERS 153-56 (1874).
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volved a breach of the peace. They had no investigative resources 19s and
were subject to suit for false arrest should they make a mistake. Further,
unlike our modern police, the constables were neither very effective nor very
powerful. The history of the constables and watchmen is one of decay,199 and
by the end of the eighteenth century with the rise of such great cities as
London, the mediaeval system of watchmen had become a national disgrace.2 0 0
If the police were not charged with the investigation of crime until the end
of the nineteenth century, it might well be asked who did investigate crime.
Until relatively modem times the investigator of crime was basically a private
function, though there were some occasions when the state became involved.
In mediaeval England the preservation of the King's peace and the investiga-
tion of crime were the joint responsibility of all the citizenry. Each citizen
was required to keep arms on hand so that he might aid in the pursuit of
known criminals, and bystanders were required to aid a peace officer in mak-
ing an arrest. The King saw to it that his criminal law was enforced 201
through his justices who at irregular intervals called twelve men from the
county (hundred) and four men from each city (borough) to present the
justices with information concerning the commission of crime in the area
since the justices had last been there. It is not known whether this group, the
ancestor of the grand jury, conducted investigations, examining witnesses
before them and hearing evidence, or whether they simply made their pre-
sentments or indictments on the basis of common knowledge and community
investigation of the crime. Since the very complete records surviving from
the Eyre of Kent (1314-15) make no mention of investigation by grand juries
at the time of presentment, the better inference is that the investigations were
conducted informally, before the eyre was convened. Crime detecting functions
appear also to have been filled by individual citizens who, if they had been
injured by a crime, had the power to prosecute the criminal by way of appeal.
Since appeal and indictment were the principal means of introducing persons
into the criminal process, it may be said that originally the investigation of
crime was almost exclusively private. Interrogation could be conducted only
with those who were willing to be interrogated, and the essential point of
confrontation would be at the trial, in which twelve members of the commu-
nity who had not been on the grand jury would check the sufficiency of the
charge against the accused. 20 2
198. Cf. 1 STEPHEN 196.
199. Dogberry is not a gross exaggeration of what the office was like in Shake-
speare's day. See Much Ado About Nothing, in SHAKESPEARE'S WORKS (Craig ed. 1951).
200. The eighteenth century constables were so poorly paid that only old men could
afford to take the job, and though the number and size of the cities had increased enor-
mously, there were no provisions made for an, increase in the number of watchmen. See
generally COLQUHOUN, ON THE POLICE OF THE METROPOLIS (1796). It was not until the
second quarter of the nineteenth century that anything like a modern police force arose
charged with the investigation of crime in the name of the state. See note 235 infra and
accompanying text.
201. See Introduction in 1 THE EYRE OF KENT xlvii-xlix (Selden Soc. ed. 1909).
202. Ibid.
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The state attempted at various times to become involved in criminal in-
vestigation. Some of the methods of investigation it adopted were surrounded
with safeguards and became part of our judicial criminal process, others
were more informal and led to something like interrogation in the sense of a
confrontation between the state and the accused in which the state tries to
obtain confessions or admissions. In the middle of the thirteenth century
the coroner's inquest, first described in Bracton, was instituted.20 3 Like the
grand jury, the coroner's jury was composed of twelve men from the hundred
and four from each borough, but, unlike the grand jury, there seems to be
little doubt that the coroner's jury heard evidence. Convened immediately
upon report of a death under suspicious circumstances, it sought first to de-
termine whether a crime had been committed and then to find out who had
committed it. Murder was thought to be too important to leave in private
hands until the eyre or the justices' coming for Gaol Delivery. The coroner's
jury, composed of laymen and a minor official, however, never really used
interrogation; the process was surrounded with too many safeguards. From
the very beginning the process seems to have been a public one and thus
open to outside control.
Investigation by the Privy Council was another method of public inquiry
into criminal activity ;204 it also arose in the thirteenth century. The council
investigated cases of great national importance and cases in which it seemed
likely that the ordinary process of justice would be subverted by the impor-
tance of the men involved. The Council initiated English use of state-oriented
methods of investigation, drawn from the Roman law,20 5 which were becoming
popular on the Continent at the time and which in many ways resembled
modem police interrogative techniques. The witness was questioned in secret,
without the benefit of counsel; he was given no inkling of whether he was
being charged with a crime or who was charging him of what; unlike modern
interrogation, the witness was also put under oath and required to answer
the questions. Interrogation by the Council was open to such great abuse,
that it was suppressed by the petition of Parliament in 1350.20 6 That it does
not seem to have died out entirely may be seen by the occasional complaints
which Parliament makes in the succeeding years that the Council is hearing
criminal cases, "non par proces de ley de ceo en arere use. '20 7 The important
thing about these complaints is not that they indicate that this extraordinary
process was still going on before the Council, but that, though Parliament
203. 3 BRAcToN 342-45 (Woodbine ed. 1915). See Statute de Officio Coronatoris,
1276, 4 Edw. 1, c. 2; 1 STEPHEN 216-19.
204. 1 STEPHEN 166-84.
205. See Introduction, in SELECT CASES BEFORE THE KING's CouNciL 1243-1482, xii-
xiii (Selden Soc. ed. 1918).
206. 1 STEPHEN 166-83.




may have been powerless to prevent it, it regarded the process as contrary
to law.
There are a number of reports of interrogation of prisoners under torture
during the reign of the Tudors.20 8 Obtaining evidence by torture was a com-
mon practice on the Continent in the Late Middle Ages and the Renaissance.
The practice had been borrowed from the Roman law during the years follow-
ing the suppression of the ordeal by the Lateran Council of 1215.209 England,
however, never seems to have lost her tradition, dating back to the Leges
Henrici Prizi,21 0 that a confession obtained by threats or force was not good
evidence. Fortescue attacks the continental practice of torture vigorously and
praises the common law rule.21' Thus when torture begins to be used in
England, it is not associated with the procedure of any court but rather is
an extraordinary proceeding, separated from the regular procedure of any
court, which is used in special cases and only at the behest of the King.
Though there are a number of reported instances of interrogation under tor-
ture during the reign of Elizabeth, the practice never became common nor
did it ever receive the color of law. Jardine reports no instances of torture
after 1640.212
The year 1640 also marked the death of a more visible and equally notorious
institution, the Privy Council's Court of Star Chamber. Apparently estab-
lished during the reign of Elizabeth,213 the Court of Star Chamber was chiefly
concerned with political crimes, and has often been identified with question-
able investigative techniques. Founded because the regular process of justice
seemed too liberal, especially for powerful defendants, the Star Chamber's
inquisitorial process was regarded as a much more effective way of finding
out the truth than the normal criminal process, and both Bacon 214 and Coke 215
regarded the court as a great and noble institution. Its nobility was neither
widely nor long appreciated; the history of the court shows that when the
power to interrogate is placed in the hands of the state it may be abused by
the noblest of judicial bodies. It became the most hated instrument of arbitrary
sovereign power and was a principal cause of the Cromwellian Revolution.
208. See generally LEA, SuPERSTrrIoN AND FORCE 500-08 (1878) ; JARDINE, READINGS
ON THE USE OF TORTuRE IN THE CRInNAL LAW OF ENGLAND (1837); PARRY, THE
HISTORY OF TORTURE IN ENGLAND (1933).
209. See LEA, op. cit. supra note 208, at 420-23.
210. Leges, 5, 16(b), LiEBERMANN, GESETZE DER ANGELSACHSEN 550 (1903).
211. FoRTESCUE, COMMENDATION OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 32-36 (Grigor transl.
1917). See 3 CorE 35.
212. JA RINE, op. cit. stpra note 208, at 53, 57-58.
213. The Court of Star Chamber should not be confused with the King's Council
sitting in the Chamber. See PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COmmoN LAW 172-
73 (4th ed. 1948). Pollard, Council, Star Chamber and Privy Council under the Tutdors,
37 ENG. HIsT. REv. 516 (1922).
214. See History of the Reign of King Henry VII, in 6 BAcoN, WORxs 85-86 (Sped-
ding ed. 1858).
215. 4 CorE 65.
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A final institution involving the state in criminal investigation during the
Tudor period was fashioned from the magistrate's hearing. The magistrate
was a judicial officer who had long been part of the system, but whose duties
prior to the sixteenth century were ill-defined.2 16 He seems originally to have
been the keeper of the local castle and hence the keeper of the safest place to
keep arrested persons until the justices came for Gaol Delivery. 17 He is first
described in a statute of 1326, 1 Edw. 3, Stat. 2, c. 16, in which he is assigned to
"keep the peace" (whence came his title, "justice of the peace"). Later on in
Edward's reign, the magistrates were empowered to "take and arrest all those
they may find by indictment or suspicion and put them in prison.12 18 How-
ever, corrupt magistrates made a practice of releasing prisoners without formal
charge, on the payment of a bribe. Since no records were kept, the justices
who came for Gaol Delivery had no way of knowing that a man had been
arrested and released. To end these abuses, and as another hesitant step
toward introduction of continental practices into English criminal procedure,
the statute, 1 & 2 Phil. & M., c. 13 (1554),219 was passed. It required that an
arrested person be brought before a magistrate to be examined and that the
examination be taken down in writing before the prisoner was allowed bail.
In addition the magistrate was to examine thoroughly the facts and circum-
stances of the case, making a written record of the depositions of witnesses
against the prisoner. Armed with the arrest power and the power to take
depositions, the magistrate began to take a very full part in the investigation
of crime; these powers, in addition to his already extensive civil powers, made
him the most important local judicial officer. From Stephen's account of the
detective work of some of the seventeenth and eighteenth century magistrates,
it appears that they did a considerable amount of interrogating. 2 0 The inter-
rogation, however, was informal. There are no accounts of a magistrate hauling
people off to gaol and questioning them there; rather he seems to have gone
out and found his suspects in their own surroundings where he questioned
them on the spot. There are few other hints as to how much magisterial in-
terrogation resembled present-day police interrogation.
216. 1 STEPHEN 219-33.
217. Cf. 1 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 285-97 (1922 ed.).
218. Justices of the Peace Act, 1360, 34 Edw. 3, c. 1.
There was apparently great controversy as to just what powers this gave the magis-
trate. That the magistrate had power to arrest on his own personal suspicion is un-
denied. The question is whether he could compel others to arrest on his suspicion, issue a
warrant or hue and cry. Coke seems to have felt that he could not, 4 COKE 176-77; Hale
that he could, 2 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 107-10 (1847). In either case it is clear
that the magistrate himself must entertain the suspicion. He could not issue a hue and
cry simply at the request of a citizen or of a constable but must inform himself sufficiently
of the matter so that he might have reasonable cause to believe that a felony had been
committed and that the person to be arrested had committed it. Cf. 1 STEPHEN 191-94.
219. See 1 STEPHEN 218-22.
220. Id. at 223-28.
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The free-wheeling and easily abused power of the magistrate probably
would have been curtailed at the end of the seventeenth century in the re-
forms which purged many of the Roman law accretions of the sixteenth
century from English criminal law, were it not for the fact that at about that
time state investigation of crime slowed of its own accord. As a result, the
older, private techniques of investigation became once more dominant.2 2 1 It
is possible to trace this shift to no particular statute; there seems rather to
have been a trend of the times away from the emphasis on public prosecution
and on the state's interest in ferreting out and punishing criminals which
had marked the seventeenth century. The various methods employed by
private parties - involving extensive use of private investigation, private
guards, and rewards - are elaborately described by Radzinowicz, 2 2 and
need not be set out here. While there was no revival of the felony appeal, the
citizen nonetheless played an important prosecutorial role. After assembling
his evidence, he presented it himself before the grand jury, who heard it and
determined whether they would return an indictment. Even when an indict-
ment was returned, the prosecution did not fall entirely in the hands of the
state, but the barrister employed to present the state's case was frequently
of the complainant's own choosing. Under this private, one might almost say
casual, system of law enforcement, the magistrate declined in importance.
Under this system judges could achieve a real impartiality between accused
and accuser. Since both the complainant and the defendant were private
parties and the violation of the rights of the defendant by the complainant's
overzealous investigation could always be remedied by a suit in tort, the
judges did not feel it necessary to scrutinize the methods by which the evi-
dence was obtained or to regulate the investigation of crime.223
In response to a greatly increasing zealousness on the part of the magistrate
at the beginning of the nineteenth century, there arose a movement to formalize
the magistrate's hearing.22 4 The principal objection to the magistrate's role
in the criminal process was that he collected and relied upon evidence without
the knowledge of the defendant and collected evidence of which the defendant
did not know. Thus the first reform, contained in the Poor Prisoner's Counsel
Act of 1836 2 gave the defendants the right to examine at trial a copy of
any depositions which the magistrate had taken against them. Twelve years
later the magistrate's hearing was subject to sweeping reform by Sir John
Jervis' Act.22 6 By that act the accused was permitted to be present at the
221. Id. 418-19, 496-99. See generally 2 RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIM-
INAL LAW (1956) ; HOWARD, op. cit. supra note 195, at 381-83. In the teeming slums of
London, the magistrate still had an, important role to play. See note 229 infra and accom-
panying text.
222. See 2 RADZINOWICZ, op. cit. supra note 221, at 33-167.
223. See authorities cited note 221 supra.
224. 1 STEPHEN 228-33.
225. The Trials for Felony Act, 1836, 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 114, § 4.
226. The Indictable Offences Act, 1848, 11 & 12 Vic., c. 42.
1964] 1039
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
examination of the witnesses; he was to have the right to cross-examine
them, and he was to be allowed counsel. 22 7 In addition the accused was per-
mitted to call and examine witnesses in his behalf; he was not required to
speak but might make a statement if he so desired. Thus the last inquisitorial
element was eliminated from the formal English procedure.
At the same time as Parliament was judicializing the magistrate's proceed-
ing there was developing a new and even more powerful instrument for the
state investigation of crime. The story of the origins of the modern police 22
is beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say, in response to the need for
police protection unmet by constables or magistrates, a London magistrate,
the magistrate of Bow Street,220 established a force of police, albeit an inade-
quate one, to guard persons and property and to aid him in investigating
crimes. In 1829 Parliament authorized 2 3 0 a police force for the whole metro-
politan area of London, on the model of the Bow Street Runners. In 1839
it established 231 similar forces in all the major cities of the kingdom and in
1856 it required the same for rural areas. 232
It is hard to say exactly when police interrogation, as we now know it,
began. The records of the Bow Street Runners show that they did a certain
amount of questioning though it was not nearly so formalized as it is now.2 33
During the bulk of the nineteenth century the courts preserved the fiction
of private investigation and treated the police as private persons. There was
no formal prosecutor; the police prosecuted personally as did a private prose-
cutor in the eighteenth century.2 4 The judiciary continued to maintain that
there was no need for judicial control of the police since their zealousness
could always be controlled by private tort suits. Gradually the investigation
of crime became more obviously a public function. During the latter half of
the nineteenth century, the police grew independent of the magistracy. In
1879 Parliament provided for the appointment of a Director of Public Prose-
cutions,2 5 and it became clear that the fiction of private prosecution could
be maintained no longer. Correspondingly, checks on state power began once
more to appear. In 1912 the English judges adopted the famous Judges'
Rules governing police interrogation. These rules, in general, provided that
the police could interrogate no accused and that upon arrest they had to
227. The right to counsel is assumed in § 17 of the act and according to Stephen
never disputed in practice. 1 STEPHEN 221.
228. See generally 3 RADZINOWICZ, op. cit. supra note 221.
229. Id. at 11-63. See generally MAITLAqD, op. cit. supra note 196, at 105-18; AI-
TAGE, THE HISTORY OF THE BOW STREET RUNNERS (1932); 1 STEPHEN 196-200.
230. Act for Improving the Police in and near the Metropolis, 1829, 10 Geo. 4, c. 44.
231. An Act for the Establishment of County and District Constables, 1839, 2 & 3
Vic., c. 93.
232. An Act to render more effectual the Police in Counties and Boroughs, 1856,
19 & 20 Vic., c. 69.
233. See, e.g., ARMITAGE, op. cit. supra note 229, at 136-38, 186-87, 235.
234. See 1 STEPHEN 493-503; MAiTLANO, op. cit. supra note 196, at 147.
235. Prosecution of Offenses Act, 1879, 42 & 43 Vie., c. 22. See 1 STEPHEN 501-03.
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warn him that any statement he might make might be used against him.2 6
Though difficulties with the application of these rules have arisen in more recent
times,237 the rules represented at the time of their adoption a clear recognition
on the part of the judiciary that the criminal process is of one piece - that
what goes on in the police station is just as much a part of the criminal process
as what goes on at trial, and that the initial confrontation with the state is
now in the police station.
Unfortunately there is no Radzinowicz for the history of criminal investi-
gation in the United States, just as there is no Stephen for the history of its
criminal law. However, given what is known about the process in the United
States, it is safe to assume that criminal investigation took roughly the same
form in eighteenth century America as in eighteenth century England. The
power of the state was not marshalled against the accused until the trial; there
were no police and, though some states seem to have had prosecutors,28s
private prosecution was the rule rather than the exception. The provisions
of the Constitution about criminal procedure support this view of the nature
of the eighteenth century process. Of the provisions in our Bill of Rights, only
the fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures,
is directed at the investigative process. Although much constitutional doctrine
concerning the police has been hung on this provision recently, historically
the Framers seem to have had tax collectors more in mind than the police.2 9
Since, in the eighteenth century criminal process, the trial marked the critical
point of confrontation between the state and the accused - that part of the
process in which the defendant's liberty was won or lost - the Framers
lavished ten specific provisions on the conduct of trials. The Framers were
determined to see that trials were conducted with the utmost fairness, and
not according to the standards of the Popish Plot.
American criminal procedure has changed since 1789, just as the English
procedure changed. We too have developed vast and powerful forces of police.
These police have consolidated the power of the state behind them and have
developed the institution of police interrogation. This development has made
the modern criminal proceeding essentially different from that of the past;
now, the point at which the individual first confronts the amassed power of
the state has moved back in the process from trial to the police stage. Ninety
per cent of those convicted have pled guilty; they never have had a trial.2 0
236. See Williams, Police Interrogation Privileges and Limitations under Foreign
Law: England, 52 J. CRa. L., C. & P.S. 50 (1960), in SOWLE 185-93; DEVlMN, THE
CRnnAL PROSECuTION IN ENGLAND 31-62 (1958).
237. See Williams, supra note 236, at 50-52, in SowLE at 186-88; Letter from Eng-
lislh Policeman on Use of Judges' Rules, in SELECTED WRITINGS ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
AND TRIAL 845-46 (Fryer ed. 1957).
238. See Prosecuition, in 1 WICKERSrAm 6-8.
239. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-25 (1886).
240. See note 58 stpra and accompanying text.
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In American judicial practice, unlike English, however, this evolution has
gone all but unnoticed until very recent times.
In the past, the reaction to the introduction of state techniques like inter-
rogation, established to provide more efficient administration of justice, has
been to establish buffers between the machinery of the state and the accused
or, where that has been impossible, to destroy the machinery. The abuses to
which interrogation by the magistrates and by the Star Chamber gave rise
greatly exceeded the advantages in terms of criminals discovered; the Star
Chamber was abolished and the magistrate's hearing was surrounded with
safeguards. When confrontation with the state occurred at trial, counsel was
found necessary because the accused was unable to defend himself.
If the point of confrontation has been pushed back to the police station,
how is the individual to be defended there? The course of history strongly
suggests that only the most extraordinary individual is capable of standing
by himself against the power of the state. It has been argued that since inter-
rogation is a passive process from the defendant's point of view and since
the defendant need not put forward a defense during interrogation, all that
he needs is someone - a policeman or, perhaps, a magistrate - to inform
him of his right to remain silent. Of course, even these protections are not
presently assured. And there are situations in which silence is not advisable;
the accused may be caught in a web of circumstantial evidence which demands
explaining, or it may be prudent for him to make some answer to his accusors
in order to avoid the possibility that the courts will regard his silence as an
"adoptive admission."' 41 In these situations, the accused needs counsel, to
help him decide whether it is advisable to speak and what kind of statement
to make. In some situations the accused may be able to make a statement in
return for a lesser charge ;242 counsel's presence may see to it that this bargain
is enforced. More important, officers of the state do not seem the most apt
buffers against the power of the state. Even where the accused would not
profit by making a statement, he may need counsel in his traditional, pro-
tective role.
If counsel were present at interrogation, he could lay open the unknown
workings of the process. 2 43 Police interrogation is an invisible process, difficult
to study. Since the only persons present are the police and the accused, infor-
mation about the process can come only from the parties involved, both of whom
are highly biased. If a man emerges from an interrogation having confessed, he
is quite likely to claim that the confession was obtained from him by foul
241. See State v. Sorge, 125 N.J.L. 445, 15 A.2d 776 (1940). But see People v.
Travato, 309 N.Y. 382, 131 N.E.2d 557 (1955) ; State v. Bates, 140 Conn. 326, 99 A.2d
133 (1953).
242. See Newman, Pleading Guilty for Considerations: A Study of Bar qain Justice,
46 J. Ci im. L., C. & P.S. 780, 781-88 (1956). Cf. HALL, THEFT, LAW AND SocIErY 142-
49 (1952).
243. Cf. Allison, He Needs a Lawyer Now, 42 Ax. JuD. Soc'v 113, 115, 117, 119
(1958).
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means; the police, on the other hand, are likely to claim that no pressure
was put on him at all, but that the burden of his guilt weighed so heavily
on him that he confessed spontaneously. We are then confronted with the
dilemma that we don't know whether counsel is necessary during police
interrogation, and we won't know what goes on during interrogation until
counsel or some outside element is there.
What attempts have been made to study the ordinary workings of the
interrogation process have produced some interesting and possibly relevant
results. In 1931, the Wickersham Commission made an elaborate study of
the use of the third degree in police interrogation, with reported cases, inter-
views, newspaper reports, and reports of the Defender organizations as source
material..2 44 The Commission came to the conclusion that police brutality
and third degree practices were common in many American cities and shock-
ingly prevalent in some. If the materials used were not all reliable, the sheer
bulk of them carries weight. In 1961, the President's Civil Rights Commission
on the basis of a more limited study, arrived at the same conclusions about
present-day police techniques.2 45 In the absence of both reliable evidence and
the possibility of collecting such evidence, it is possible to say -- at the
least - that police brutality has been a common method for obtaining con-
fessions in some places in the past and that there are sufficiently frequent
charges of it now to suggest that it is still present if not quite as common today.
Counsel's presence at interrogation could serve as a substantial guard against
such practices.
Obtaining information about and protecting against brutal practices do not
mark the limits of counsel's possible role. The highly charged nature of the
situation in which the accused finds himself and the nature of the "ordinary"
interrogative methods which the police admit to using are sufficient to give
one pause about allowing police interrogation to continue without safeguards.
The accused is all alone in the sinister venue of the police station. Taken from
his friends and from familiar surroundings by the authority of the state, he is
questioned in secret by an officer of the state. The less experienced he is, the
more terrifying the circumstances will seem. Any questioning would be "coer-
cive," and the methods used by the police, do not make it less S0.240 Interroga-
tion, the manuals say,247 should be conducted in private, in a small, bare room
with no windows and with but one door, so that the interrogated person can
have nothing to distract him from the persistence of the interrogator. Privacy
is essential, since a man will reveal in private what he never would reveal in
a group. The interrogator may choose one of two tacks: he may decide to
244. 4 WICKERSHAi 22-24, 152-55.
245. Equal Justice under the Law, in JusTicE, 5 UNITED STATES CO-A,1ISSION ON
CIVIL RIGHTS REPORTS 16-18 (1961). See generally id. at 5-28, 109.
246. A fine statement of this argument and a review of the police manual material
is to be found in Brief for the ACLU as Amicus Curiae, pp. 5-14, Escobedo v. Illinois,
84 Sup. Ct. 203 (1963).
247. See authorities cited supra note 57.
1964] 1043
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
sympathize with the suspect, minimizing the guilt of his crime, and claiming
that anyone caught in the same web of circumstances would commit the crime,
or he may be hard on the man by claiming that escape and lying are no use,
that the police have all the evidence necessary to prove his guilt, or that only
a "punk" would act as he has. Numerous tricks are available to get the de-
fendant to talk. The investigator may claim that a co-defendant has talked
and flourish a document purporting to be his confession, or the investigators
may operate in a team, one of them taking the "hard" approach and the
other the "soft" approach. Since these manuals are written by the defenders
of the system, we can assume that at least this much coercion is exerted.
The dangers of this system are obvious. The kind of "civilized" interroga-
tion recommended by Inbau and others leaves so much discretion in the police
that other, "uncivilized" methods, are likely to follow. Relay questioning can
easily lead to all night questioning depriving the victim of food and sleep.
The "hard" approach which is to be used on "non-emotional" offenders can,
when mistakenly used on "emotional" offenders lead to confessions of non-
existent crimes. There seems but a short step between the "hard" approach
and actual threats of violence. The police speak continually of the dangers of
organized crime when they seek to have their powers extended ;248 yet the
overwhelming majority of confession cases which have been before the Su-
preme Court in recent years have involved either private crimes of passion
or property crimes committed by sociopaths in the lower economic brackets.2 49
Thus there is a strong suspicion that it is only the weak and the first offenders
who confess under police pressure while the hardened criminal knows of his
right to keep silent and refuses to talk to the police, unless it is to his advan-
tage in striking a "plea bargain." This suspicion is confirmed by the Wicker-
sham Commission's finding that professional criminals are usually not victims
of the third degree.250 The basic danger with interrogation is that use of it
in many cases undercuts a basic premise of our system of justice; we do not
feel that a man should be made against his will to condemn himself out of his
own mouth. "Ours," as Justice Frankfurter said in Watts v. Indiana, "is an
accusatorial as opposed to an inquisitorial system.1
2 51
Interrogation is not only a point of confrontation between the individual
and the state, but is also a point of confrontation at which the defendant, espe-
cially if inexperienced, is incapable of handling himself. Counsel could serve
equally well here as he does at trial as a buffer between the individual and the
state. Counsel could: advise the accused of the proper statements to make
248. See authorities cited infra note 253.
249. For the typical defendant in a confession, case see, e.g., Culombe v. Connecticut,
367 U.S. 568 (1961) ; Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) ; Ashdown v. Utah, 357
U.S. 426 (1958) ; Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957). See also 4 WICKzRSH Mxi 156-
72; Weisberg, Police Interrogation of Arrested Persons, 52 J. CRim. L., C. & P.S. 35-36
(1961), in SOWLE at 168-69. But cf. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953).
250. 4 WICEsRSHAM 156-72.
251. 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949). "Such has been the characteristic of Anglo-American
criminal justice since it freed itself from the practices borrowed by the Star Chamber
from the Continent whereby an accused was interrogated in secret for hours on end."
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should the accused wish to make a statement; see to it that the police did not
use brutal means to obtain a confession; and assure that the police did not
trap the defendant into making a statement against his will, 'by eliminating
much of the inherently coercive atmosphere of the invisible police process.
The reason why counsel's presence at interrogation has not heretofore been
thought necessary is clear from history. In the past, the gathering of informa-
tion about crimes was, in the main, a highly informal, private process, which
did not confront the accused with the full adversary force of the state until
trial; there was no judicial control outside the private remedies of tort. Today,
the police process is the point at which the state enters; for ninety per cent of
those ultimately convicted of felony, it marks the only point of meaningful
confrontation.
THE STATE'S INTEREST IN INTERROGATION
Yet it is not possible, without more, to thrust counsel into the interrogation
process. Proponents of such an extension are always faced with the fervid
argument that presence of counsel during interrogation would make interroga-
tion impossible, and, without interrogation, the orderly investigation of crime
would be impossible. There is no empirical evidence that the first assertion is
true; it is merely argued that counsel would invariably advise his client to
keep silent and that all possibility of interrogation would thus be ended.25 2
Assuming this to be the case, it may yet be doubted that the end of inter-
rogation would result in the collapse of law enforcement or the end of all
effective investigation of crime.253
In the absence of any thorough study of how many crimes are solved by
interrogation, it is difficult either to verify or to refute the statements that
interrogation is the only way to solve certain crimes and to obtain clinching
evidence in others. Yet there are some indications that the predictions of dis-
aster ought not to be taken at face value. Institutionalized, broad-scale inter-
rogation is a product of the late nineteenth century. In the last 50 years, of
course, society may have become so impersonal and vast that interrogation is
now necessary; but the development of police interrogation suggests that so-
cietal complexity is an inadequate explanation for the growth of this tech-
nique. India 251 and Scotland 25 have strict rules excluding from evidence infor-
252. Justice Jackson so argues in Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (con-
curring opinion). The argument is assumed in Crooker, 357 U.S. at 441.
253. The arguments for the absolute necessity of interrogation. may be found in
Inbau, Police Interrogation--A Practical Necessity, 52 J. CRIm. L., C. & P.S. 16 (1961);
1958 Senate Hearings at 2, 123, 124 (statements of Judge Holtzoff, Robert Murray and
Edgar Scott) ; Hearings before Special Subcommittee to Study Decisions of the Supreme
Court of the House Judiciary Committee, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 12, pt. 1 at 2, 32, 44
(1957) [hereinafter referred to as 1957 House Hearings].
254. Indian Evidence Act §§ 25-26 (1872). See 2 CHrrALEY & RAo, THE INDIAN
EVIDENCE AcT §§ 25-26 (1956).
255. Chalmers v. H. M. Advocate, [1954] Sess. Cas. 66, has an excellent review of
the Scottish law which seems to exclude "the fruit of the poisonous tree" but not "spon-
taneous" admissions. See W AL=a & WALnxR, THE LAW oF EVIDENCE IN SCOTLAND 37-
41 (1964).
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mation, including confessions, obtained as a result of police interrogation; this
practice, which approaches a ban on interrogation, does not seem to have
marked effects on those nations' enforcement of their criminal statutes. Nor
can substantial detriment be found in the federal and state jurisdictions which
operate under the McNabb-Mallory rule 256 or an equivalent. If the experience
of the F.B.I. can be discounted because their work differs somewhat from that
of the average local police force and because they have more substantial re-
sources at their disposal, the District of Columbia and Michigan police 257 also
operate under strict limitations on police interrogation. There is a temptation
to think that once a problem has been solved in one way there is no other way
to solve it ;258 yet when existing procedures are foreclosed, new solutions
usually emerge.2 59
There is, however, the problem of costs. The price of introducing counsel
at the interrogation stage might well prove significant. There would be a con-
siderable alteration of state criminal procedures. Doubtless, the work of the
police would become more difficult and time-consuming, as the gathering of
physical evidence and the questioning of witnesses grew in importance for
the solution of crimes. Given Gideon's apparent requirement that appointed
counsel be provided wherever retained counsel is allowed in the criminal
proce'ss, 260 the state would also bear the expense of appointed counsel in cases
involving the poor. Yet this last expense may not be too great if Gideon also
stands for the proposition that the right to appointed counsel must be pushed
back to the preliminary hearing. Since the number of people at the police
stage of the process seems to be about the same as at preliminary hearing, the
expense of introducing counsel one step back to police interrogation will not
be as great as it might at first seem. California's experimentation with ap-
pointed counsel at preliminary hearing shows that though there is an added
cost, it is not so high as to be impractical.
261
256. See statement of J. Edgar Hoover in FRANK, NOT GUILTY 185 (1957). See
note 69 supra; CIVIL RIGHTS COMMIssIoN, op. cit. supra note 245, at 109-10.
257. 359 Mich. 410, 102 N.W.2d 738 (1960).
258. After the Mallory case severely curtailed the use of interrogation by the District
of Columbia police, Robert Murray, the Chief of Police of the District, appeared before a
subcommittee of the House Judiciary and testified that confessions were necessary for the
solution of close to ninety per cent of the crimes in the District. 1957 House Hearings
at 43. A year later Oliver Gasch, the U.S. Attorney of the District, stated that fewer
than five per cent of the cases in the District had been affected by Mallory. See Weis-
berg, supra note 249, at 27, 33-34 n.60, in SOWLE at 159-60, 167 & n.60.
259. See Rothblatt & Rothblatt, Police Interrogation: The Right to Counsel and
Prompt Arraignment, 27 BROOKLYN L. REV. 24, 66-68 (1960); Allison, supra note 243,
at 116-18.
This view is old. The drafters of the Indian Evidence Act told Sir James Stephen
that the reason for interrogation was that, "It is far pleasanter to sit comfortably in the
shade rubbing pepper into a poor devil's eyes than to go about in the sun hunting up
evidence." 1 STEPHEN 442 n. 1.
260. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
261. See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
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Another cost to society, which many might find more troubling than added
administrative expense, is the fear and losses which must be endured if "crim-
inals" go free. The abolition of interrogation, it is argued, would serve no
purpose but to free the guilty, since the innocent never confess. The argument
is, first, wrong on its premises; many innocent people confess to crimes they
did not commit.262 If the accused is of the type likely to make a compulsive
confession, the kind of narrow leading questions the police ask in an inter-
rogation supply him with all the details sufficient to make up a plausible story
of crime. Even if only the guilty did confess, moreover, this argument would
still have little force. The area of confessions like the area of illegal search is
one in which we control the behavior of the police toward the innocent by
controlling their behavior toward the guilty. The law of confessions is not
that we shall exclude all untrustworthy confessions but that we shall exclude
all involuntary confessions. 263 Many "criminals" escape because illegally seized
evidence may not be used at trial, many "criminals" escape because we do not
permit torture, and many "criminals" escape because we do not allow hear-
say evidence to be admitted at trials. It has never been claimed that ours is
the most efficient system of enforcing a criminal law; what is claimed is that
the system allows the individual the most freedom compatible with holding
society together with a criminal law. We have long since circumscribed the
primitive notion of criminality, that all who have committed forbidden acts
are guilty, with rules describing the way in which guilt must be found. The
criminal process is not simply a fact-finding process but a process for finding
facts in a certain way. Guilt that is not sufficiently notorious, so that it must
be found from the mouth of the criminal himself or by breaking into his house
and seizing his private papers, is not guilt sufficient for the invocation of the
criminal process. 264 Besides, the really grave danger of the professional crim-
inal is in no way mitigated by the institution of police interrogation if only
the weak, the psychotic, and the first offenders confess under police pressure,
while the hardened criminal knows of his right to keep silent and talks only
262. See N.Y. Post, Mar. 23, 1964, p. 3, cols. 4 & 5 ("2 Confessions to 1 Slaying:
D.A. Asks Why") ; F K, op. cit. supra note 248. at 165-80 (1957). See also REIK,
THE COiPULSION TO CONFESS (1959).
263. Broadly summarized by Frankfurter, J. in Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S.
568 (1961).
264. Perhaps Mencken put it best, though cynically, when, he said:
Most of us aspire to the majority of those acts [criminal acts] in secret, and some
of us commit them surreptitiously, but the man who performs them in such a man-
ner that the fact becomes notorious is a menace to the security of the rest of us,
and we go through the solemn hocus-pocus of seizing him and trying him, and
pump up indignation over his rascality and finally visit upon him the thing called
punishment.
A Maencken Chrestomathy, in VOICES IN COURT 540 (Davenport ed. 1958).
For this argument applied to self-incrimination see McNaughton, The Privilege
against Self-Incrinination, 51 J. CRim. L., C. & P.S. 138, 146 (1960), in SOWLE at 223,
232.
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when it is to his advantage. 265 Then too, the vigor of criminal law enforce-
ment has little demonstrable effect on the amount of crime.26  Our system
does not strive for one hundred per cent enforcement. As Professor Schwartz
has aptly stated:
The paradoxical fact is that arrest, conviction and punishment of every
criminal would be a catastrophe. Hardly one of us would escape, for we
have all at one time or another committed acts that the law regards as
serious offenses . . . 100% law enforcement would not leave enough
people at large to build and man the prisons in which the rest of us would
reside.267
If the criminal process catches a sufficient number of the perpetrators of
notorious crimes that the risk of being caught is a substantial one, it has done
its job of deterrence.
STRIKING THE BALANCE - A LOOK AT COUNSEL AT INTERROGATION
The weight of the elements in the balance between the interest of the in-
dividual in counsel at interrogation and the interest of the state in interroga-
tion is quite different from what Justice Clark assumed it to be. The right to
counsel is not a recent grant of largess by society, bestowed only when society
could afford it. Rather, it is one of the oldest of our procedural rights, which
was denied by the power-seeking state of the seventeenth century only to re-
turn in the eighteenth and to be placed in the Bill of Rights. Counsel does not
only serve the function of providing technical aid; he is also a needed buffer
at the point of confrontation between the state and the accused, put there be-
cause the accused is incapable of defending himself in this moment of stress.
When the Bill of Rights was put into effect, its draftsmen recognized that the
crucial point of confrontation was at trial. The investigative process, on the
other hand, was private; state and accused did not meet until the trial. Now
the investigative process is in the hands of the state, and the state and the
accused meet during interrogation, in the back room of the police station. If
the standards of the Framers are to be enforced in modem times, these stand-
ards must be applied at the critical point in the criminal process, no matter
where in the process that critical point moves. Interrogation as it is now
practiced is a perilous time for the accused, who is defenseless against the
abuses of both physical and psychological coercion. Even when there is no in-
tention to make the situation coercive, the questioning of an accused, alone
in an alien atmosphere, must be inherently coercive. Counsel, by serving in his
traditional role as buffer against the state, could remove the dangers of the
situation.
On the other side of the balance is the argument that the presence of coun-
sel will emasculate the process of interrogation and thus cripple or destroy
265. See notes 242, 249 supra and accompanying text.
266. See Adenaes, General Prevention-Illusion or Reality?, 42 J. CIn. L., C. &
P.S. 176 (1952).
267. Schwartz, On Current Proposals to Legalize Wire Tapping, 103 U. PA. L. REv.
157 (1954).
1048 [Vol. 73 : 1000
1964] COUNSEL AT INTERROGATION 1049
the enforcement of law. Assuming the predicted end to interrogation, the latter
argument, it has been seen, is an overstatement. From the cases on confession
there is a strong suspicion that only the weak confess, while the professional
criminal is too canny to be trapped. Interrogation has not proved indispens-
able in the past; and, to a great degree two foreign jurisdictions and two
jurisdictions in the United States do without it today. Substantial elements
do remain on the state's side of the balance; if counsel makes interrogation
impossible, some criminals will probably escape. Secondly, furnishing counsel
at this stage would be expensive, if not so expensive as to be completely im-
practical. Thirdly, the states would have to change their criminal processes.
The question is whether these elements are as substantial as they seemed in
Crooker in light of our analysis of the right to counsel.
If the balance is established in this way there is no longer the presumption
against the extension of the right to counsel. Rather, the burden is on the
states to show that there are overriding policy considerations in their favor.
The states have come forward only with assertions of the absolute necessity
of interrogation, unsupported by any empirical evidence; these may be met
with assertions, equally unsupported, that interrogation is not necessary. If
the gathering of data concerning police interrogation is at all possible, those
engaged in criminal investigation who argue for the necessity of interrogation
are presumably the most capable to do it. Similarly state policy makers are
most able to gather data on the issue of expense. In the absence of data on
either of these topics, the weight of the balance seems clearly on the side of
the fundamental right, the right to counsel.
Thus our conclusions favor counsel during interrogation even if the result
is the end of interrogation. But the fact that most prosecutors do not now inter-
rogate a man once he has obtained counsel 268 does not mean that they would
find interrogation with counsel useless. Nor does the present practice of crim-
inal lawyers of advising his client to keep silent during interrogation mean
that he would invariably advise silence if he were permitted to be present and
to have some control over the process. The attorney has not, contrary to gen-
erally accepted notions, seen his role as constant impediment to the criminal
process, making it as hard for the state as possible. In many cases full dis-
closure is exchanged for a lesser charge. In fact, more guilty pleas are ob-
tained from counseled defendants than from noncounseled ones.2 6 9 Further-
more, an attorney may find the flow of information helpful. Counsel now does
not invariably advise his client not to take the stand at trial. Similarly, at
interrogation, participating counsel may find out what the District Attorney
really knows about the case.270
268. See Letters from United States Attorneys to the Yale Law Jourital April-May
1963, on file Yale Law Library; Note, Reaffirmation of Confessions, 72 YALE L.J. 1434,
1454 n.106.
269. See Newman, supra note 242, at 782, 785-86.
270. See Allison, supra note 243, at 119. Cf. Weisberg, supra note 249, at 44, in
SOWLE at 179.
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Finally, it should be noted that the presence of counsel might result in a
number of gains beyond that of protecting the accused against the state. One
of the possible effects concerns the role which counsel is to play as a fact-
finder and as a preparer of the case. It would shock the public to discover
that the District Attorney and the police did not begin their investigation of a
criminal case until two months after the crime took place, but this is frequent-
ly the situation of defense counsel.2 7 1 A requirement that counsel be present
during interrogation would put counsel into the picture earlier, making pos-
sible a more effective investigation of the crime. Furthermore, reform is only
possible if the system of police interrogation is understood. But we can only
understand the system if it is made more visible. Reducing the miasma of
indefinite rules and doctrine has been a traditional achievement of counsel.
He might well clarify the law which presently governs police procedure. Even
if counsel did not bring about an immediate clarification of police law, his
presence would certainly make it easier for the courts to apply the existing
law to police problems by providing a new source of judicial insight into the
invisible processes of the police station.
272
Some may reject entirely the notion of counterbalanced considerations and
fall back on the argument that the Bill of Rights simply was not intended to
apply to the police stage of the criminal process. The Framers, so the argu-
ment runs, viewed the criminal process as having two stages, a fact-finding
stage preceding indictment, and a judicial stage beginning with indictment,
and they did not intend the Bill to cover the former.273 Thus there is an
271. See Beaney, Right to Counsel Before Arraignment, 45 MINN. L. REv. 771, 780
(1961) ; Allison, supra note 243, at 119.
272. To the extent that the assurance of safeguards against police brutality would
improve the public relations of the police, one of the effects may be that the police will
find witnesses more willing to talk to them. See generally Westley, Violence and the
Police, 59 Ams. J. SocioLOGy 34 (1953) ; Weisberg, Police Interrogation of Arrested
Persons, in SOWLE 153, 170-71.
273. We see the notion applied to the right to counsel in the early New Jersey case
of State v. Murphy, 87 N.J.L. 515, 94 AtI. 640 (1915). In that case the defendant urged
that his conviction. be overruled because he had been persistently denied counsel while he
was in the police station after his arrest. The court held that there was no right to coun-
sel at the time of arrest; the sixth amendment does not apply to the states, and even if
it did, the amendment commands that a man have "the Assistance of counsel for his
defence." In no way, the court held, could what goes on in the police station be regarded
as part of a man's defense. See Roberts v. State, 145 Neb. 658, 17 N.W.2d 666 (1945).
This notion has found acceptance in our own day in the concurring opinion of Justice
Stewart in Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 326-27, in which he said that the question-
ing was illegal because it had been produced by interrogation without counsel after in-
dictment. The thrust of the opinion was that if the interrogation had been before indict-
ment and without counsel it would have been permissible. Prior to People v. Donovan,
13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963), the New York Court of Appeals
had pushed the right to counsel back to preliminary hearing, but had not held that there
was a right at arrest, the time at which interrogation is most likely. People v. Meyer, 11
N.Y.2d 162, 182 N.E.2d 103 (1960); People v. Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d 561, 175 N.E.2d
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absolute right to counsel at trial based on the sixth amendment, a right only
to retained counsel at preliminary hearing based on general notions of due
process, and a right to retained counsel during interrogation only if funda-
mental fairness demands it. This argument depends on a literalistic interpre-
tation of the Bill of Rights-an interpretation which forgets that when the
Bill was enacted, the first stage of the process was purely private; the full
force of the state did not exist behind it. The words of the sixth amendment
are plainly sufficient to support a requirement that counsel be present at all
stages in the state's proceeding against an accused. It seems hypocritical to
declare that no one is convicted without benefit of the Bill of Rights, if those
rights are not available in the back room of the police station where the real
determination of guilt or innocence is made.
THE EFFECTUATION OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
If the conclusions reached above are followed to their logical end, the right
to counsel at the police station must be found to be as pervasive as the present
right to counsel at trial. To make the right thoroughly effective, the accused
must be put in touch with counsel as soon as he is arrested, so that he may
have the benefit of counsel's presence and advice throughout the process of
confrontation with the state. To insure that counsel is afforded, the accused
must be told of his rights at a very early stage by an impartial person, such
as a magistrate. Appointed counsel must be available for the poor wherever
retained counsel is available for those who can afford him. To prevent police
circumvention of the rules, all evidence obtained from the accused by police
interrogation, either before counsel enters the case or after he enters but in
his absence, would have to be excluded. Of course, once the accused had a
lawyer, the police would be free to interrogate him so long as the lawyer was
present. Exceptions for spontaneous confessions and for interrogation after
an explicit and intelligent waiver of counsel might be allowed by analogy to
present exceptions under McNabb-Mallory and the federal cases on waiver
of counsel. Conceivably, other exceptions would be developed. But the system
as a whole would provide counsel for every felony defendant soon after his
entry into the police process, and the system would be enforced by stringent
exclusionary rules.
Political reality and current Supreme Court practice, however, promise that
the fruition of this logic, if adopted by the Court, will be long in coming. The
problems of effectuating the right were probably crucial in leading the Crooker
Court to decide that the right to counsel was not absolute. The placing of
counsel at interrogation will involve deep-seated changes in the criminal pro-
cedures of the states, changes which the states may not be anxious to make
and which are of uncertain expense and effect. It is one thing to find a prior
445, 216 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1961); People v. DiBiasi, 7 N.Y.2d 544, 166 N.E.2d 825, 200
N.Y.S.2d 21 (1960). See note 87 supra.
For the two-stage notion of the criminal process also see Post v. United States, 361
U.S. 583 (1896); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1891).
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Court mistaken in its assessment of the history and function of counsel; it is
another -to develop a system for assuring that the accused gets the counsel to
which he has a right. Legislatures might-but probably will not-provide for
early appointment of counsel by magistrates or make other sweeping changes
in the criminal procedures of their jurisdictions.Y4 The Court is presented in
Escobedo with only one case-that of an accused accomplice to murder who re-
quested that his retained counsel be permitted to advise him during interroga-
tion; while the Court may engage in expansive dicta, it has compelling reasons
to move slowly, making its changes in response to principle, but no faster than
its docket requires.
There are two solutions open to the Court in Escobedo. The Court might
do no more than declare that there is a constitutional right to counsel in the
police station and remand the case to the Illinois courts, leaving for them the
problem of effectuation. In Wolf v. Colorado 275 the Court held that the fourth
amendment right to freedom from search and seizure applied to the states as
well as to the federal government, but left the means of enforcing the right to
state courts and legislatures. Only after a twelve year period of experimen-
tation, in which it was found that the states adopted the exclusionary rule
or failed to respond, did the Supreme Court adopt a uniform means of effec-
tuation. Here the experience might be different. After their experience with
Mapp v. Ohio,2 7 6 state courts and legislatures might more readily fashion
their own solution to the problem. Permitting state experimentation would
blunt reaction to the decision since there would be less of an incursion on
state prerogatives.
Yet, the experience under Weeks and McNabb-Mallory has shown almost
conclusively that solutions other than exclusionary rules are seriously lacking
in effectiveness. 27r The other alternative open to the Court is to recognize
274. See note 277 infra.
275. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
276. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
277. Many states, for example, have statutes requiring that the police produce the
accused before a magistrate "without unnecessary delay." See 1958 Senate Hearings 735-48
(Maryland is the only state without a statute concerning magistrate's hearing). These
statutes do nothing about seeing to it that counsel is present during interrogation. Ex-
perience with prompt production statutes also has shown that the base statutory com-
mand is not enough to make them obeyed. See Chaffee, Memorandum on the Detention
of Arrested Persons and their Production before a Committing Magistrate, in 2 CHAFrEE,
DOCUMENTS IN FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS 502-09 (1951). Several states make it a
misdemeanor for a police officer to violate provisions of the arrest law. See, e.g., NEW YORK
PENAL LA, § 1844 (1955). The problem with these provisions seems to be the prose-
cutors simply will not enforce them. See Rothblatt & Rothblatt, supra note 259, at 44;
CiviL RIGHTS ComMIss ON, op. cit. supra note 245, at 79-80. Another way of enforcing
laws against the police is by providing those injured with a remedy in tort. Tort remedies,
however, are a product of an, age in which investigation was a private function and do
not seem effective today. The plaintiff has great difficulty in proving damages, and juries
seem unwilling to bring in a verdict for plaintiff. Even if he gets a judgment, the plaintiff
is likely to find the policeman judgment-proof and the State unwilling to waive immunity.
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this fact and find for itself that the confession was improperly admitted. Under
the particular facts of Escobedo, involving a confession obtained after denial
of a request for retained counsel, such a holding would not encroach upon
vast areas of state terrain. Since a request was involved, the decision would
not force upon the states new procedures for apprising an accused of his rights
nor threaten the exclusion of evidence obtained before the police had notice
that the accused wished to proceed no further. Since retained counsel was
involved, the spectre of burgeoning public defender obligations and expenses
is not immediately raised. That the evidence sought to be excluded is a con-
fession directly obtained during interrogation makes it unnecessary for the
Court to reach the question whether only direct statements must be excluded,
as is presently the case under McNabb-Mallory,28 or all "fruit of the poison-
ous tree," as is the case under the Mapp rule.27 9 Whether the limitations
deriving from these distinctions would long remain is conjectural. The "re-
quest" rationale not only raises difficult problems of proof, when the police
deny that a request for counsel has been made, but also seems to penalize the
ignorant who may be most in need of counsel's aid. The retained counsel-
appointed counsel line has been thoroughly discredited by Gideon; the failure
to adopt a "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine for McNabb-Mallory has
been the major difficulty with that rule, for it has given the police some en-
couragement to withhold the accused from the commissioner.280 The states
might well apprehend that change is in the wind. Yet, to the extent that the
forecast is uncertain, and that the process of change occurs over a span of
time, they would have substantial opportunity to shape their own institutions
to accommodate the new insight into counsel's role.21
See CIVIL RIGHTS CoMMISSlON, op. cit. supra note 245, at 80-82. See generally Foote,
Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. Rnv. 493 (1955).
It has been denied that exclusionary rules actually affect police practice, but this state-
ment has been severely challenged as lacking in empirical backing. Compare Waite, Judges
and the Crime Burden, 54 MicH. L. Rv. 169 (1955), with Paulsen, The Exclusionary
Rule and M1isconduct by the Police, 52 J. Car=. L., C. & P.S. 255, 262, in SOWLE 87, 95.
The F.B.I. and the District Police say that they are obeying the exclusionary rules affect-
ing them. See notes 256, 258 supra.
278. See Rothblatt & Rothblatt, supra note 259, at 40-42; compare Goldsmith v.
United States, 277 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1960), with Armpriester v. United States, 256
F.2d 294, 296-97 (4th Cir. 1955) (dictum).
279. See Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64-65 (1954) ; Silverthorne Lumber
Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
280. See Note, supra note 268, at 1443; note 278 supra.
281. Courts other than the Supreme Court have been experimenting with exclusionary
rules designed to effectuate the presence of counsel earlier in, the criminal process. The
New York courts, for example, have developed a rule which provides that all evidence
obtained from interrogation without counsel after indictment or preliminary hearing
(called arraignment in New York) is inadmissible. Recently this doctrine has been ex-
panded to include pre-arraignment interrogation from which retained counsel has been
excluded. See notes 87, 265 supra. There is some question whether the new New York
doctrine applies to the "fruit of the poisonous tree." Judge Van Voorhis in dissent in
People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 161, 193 N.E.2d 628, 635-36, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841, 851-52
19641 1053
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
The Court, as well, will benefit by proceeding through a series of cases,
each providing a full airing of the considerations relevant to a given issue,
rather than by importing the right to counsel whole into the police stage. Such
a process characterized the development of right to counsel in judicial pro-
ceedings; it seems reasonable to expect that development of right to counsel
in the police station will be parallel. The courts will have to deal with the
accused who did not ask for counsel in the police station because he did not
know of the right, and with the accused who did know of his right but couldn't
afford counsel. If provision is made for appointment, the case may arise in
which the accused is informed of his right to counsel but is not offered ap-
pointed counsel; in another, the accused may be offered counsel but may de-
cline to take the offer so that the question of waiver arises. Defendants could,
eventually, pose narrower, administrative issues, that counsel was incompetent,
or in league with the prosecutor, or willfully absent at a critical point during
the interrogation. Counsel in some cases may have been allowed by the police
to advise his client outside the interrogation room but only allowed to be
present and silent during the interrogation itself. The hazy distinction be-
tween witnesses and those accused might cause difficulties, as it has in Eng-
land, where the police have a tendency to prolong the period before actual
accusation in order to avoid the rigors of the Judges' Rules.2 82 That similar
problems have arisen in the trial field does not mean that the solutions to them
will be the same in the police field or that the courts and legislatures should
automatically transfer all the doctrine of counsel to this new context. A prin-
cipal ingredient of the present situation is our ignorance of what actually hap-
pens during interrogation. Counsel should be able to tell us more of the process.
And as counsel observes the process it will change. Whatever solution is
reached, the states will have to review their role in the administration of right-
to-counsel in the police station.
If appointed counsel is provided, each state will have to decide what kind
of institution is best equipped to provide counsel at interrogation in its par-
ticular area - public defender, private legal aid, court appointment, or a
(1963), says that it does, but the case he cites for the proposition, People v. Rodriquez,
11 N.Y.2d 279, 222 N.Y.S.2d 353, 183 N.E.2d 651, simply excludes a confession produced
by the use of illegally seized articles.
In a recent case in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, Lee v. United States, 322 F.2d
770 (5th Cir. 1963), the court, combining the Crooker doctrine with the old New York
doctrine, held that the trial court should have excluded a confession made after indictment
and in the absence of counsel, because the defendant's age and circumstances made it un-
fair to question him without counsel. By combining the rule of Lee with the McNabb-
Mallory rule the Fifth Circuit has substantially prevented the federal police from inter-
rogating accused persons in the absence of counsel. All that is missing is a recognition
that the right to counsel is an absolute both before and after indictment, in addition to a
requirement that not only evidence obtained in his absence but products of that evidence
be excluded.
282. See authorities cited notes 236-37 supra.
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mixed public-private organization. 28 3 Statutes might govern the scheduling of
interrogation; who should perform the interrogating function, when it might
be performed, whether a lawyer could seek a stay of the interrogation of his
client, or whether he would have to be present regardless of how inconvenient
the time.
The legislatures might also consider guiding the process of police interroga-
tion in such a way as to change the institution. They might consider how
much criminal discovery should approximate civil discovery. To the extent
that an interrogation became more like a deposition, the state might want to
consider making mandatory the answering of all but self-incriminating ques-
tions. An attorney should be permitted to have access to the courts to prevent
interrogations from becoming abusively time-consuming or harassing. On the
other hand, the state might consider making criminal investigation less of an
adversary process by facilitating joint investigation of crime by defense coun-
sel and prosecutor, a concept towards which the German criminal procedure
seems to be heading,284 or by introducing judicial interrogation, a procedure
used in France.
2 83
APPENDIX OF COLONIAL PROVISIONS ON COUNSEL TO 1800
NEW HAMPSHIRE: There is little on the early courts ir New Hampshire. The Con-
stitution of 1776 contains no reference to counsel, though this does not necessarily mean
that New Hampshire's courts were not allowing counsel. See Rackow, The Right to
Counsel: English and American Precedents, 11 Wm. & MARY Q. 1, 13-14 (3d ser. 1954).
The 1784 Constitution contains a provision that in criminal prosecutions, "[E]very sub-
ject shall have a right . . . to be fully heard in his defence by himself, and counsel."
N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. XV (1784), 4 FEERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS COLONIAL
CHARTERS AND ORGANIC LAWS 2455 (Thorpe ed. 1909) [hereinafter cited as THORPE].
VERMONT: The Constitution of 1777 contains provisions similar to New Hampshire's
of 1784. VT. CONST. ch. I, § 10; 6 THORPE 3741.
MASSACHUSETTS: Early Massachusetts courts frequently ignored the common law;
they may have ignored the fact-law distinction though this is not certain. See Rackow,
supra at 14. In 1777 Massachusetts passed an act allowing both retained and appointed
counsel in trials for treason. 2 MAss. LAws 1049 (1807). The Declaration of Rights in
283. See generally SPECIAL COM 1ITTEE OF THE NEW YORK BAR TO STUDY DEFENDER
SysTEis, EQUAL JUSTICE FOR THE ACCUSED (1959); Symposium Proceedings of the
New England Defender Conference, 47 Am. JUD. Soc'Y 159-200 (1964).
284. See Clemens, Police Interrogation: Privileges and Limitations under Foreign
Law: Germany, 52 J. CRIm. L., C. & P.S. 59; in SOWLE at 196.
285. See Vouin, id., France, 52 id. at 57, in SOWLE at 193; Pound, Legal Interroga-
tion of Persons Accused or Suspected of Crime, 24 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 1014 (1934).
A common law tradition, however, might make the legislatures wary of making inter-
rogation a favored institution, or of emphasizing so much the interest of the state in the
interrogation process.
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the Constitution of 1780 contains a provision similar to New Hampshire's. MASS. CONST.
pt. I, art. 12 (1780) ; 3 THORPE 1891.
RHODE ISLAND: This state seems to have been inimical to the legal profession in
general; it may not have allowed counsel beyond the common law provisions. See REiNSCH,
THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW IN THE EARLY AMERICAN COLONIES 29 (1889); 2 ARNOLD,
THE HISTORY OF THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND 78 (1859). In 1666 Rhode Island passed
a comprehensive statute governing the conduct of her courts. LAwS AND ACTS OF RHODE
ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS 1636-1705, [15]-[18] (Rider ed. 1896). Plate 29
prescribes that after the jury is impaneled "the Partys" shall "have there Lawful Ex-
ceptions by themselves or Attorneys who are to plead their Cases." This provision may
apply only to civil cases, however, since the specifically criminal section (plate 30) does
not mention counsel. On the other hand, the list of fees permissible for an attorney to
charge (plate 31) prescribes that no attorney may take more than Is. 8d. for "acquittall
of felony or suspicion thereof" or for "acquittall of murder," indicating that attorneys did
perform some function in criminal cases. In 1669 this act was clarified by one allowing
any indicted person to procure an attorney to plead a point of law because the accused
"may be innocent and yett not bee accomplished with soe much wisdome and Knowledge
of the law as to plead his own innocencye, &c." 2 R.I. COLONIAL RECORDS 238-39 (Bart-
lett ed. 1857). In 1798 Rhode Island passed a statute substantially similar to the sixth
amendment of the federal constitution. Declaration of Rights § 6, RI. REV. PuB. LAws
80-81 (1798).
CONNECTICUT: This state had no statutory provisions similar to its fellow New
England states, nor did it pass a constitution around the time of the Revolution. Zepaniah
Swift says, however, that the legislature had abolished the English common law of coun-
sel with its facts-law distinction and that the Connecticut courts told defendants of their
right to freely assigned counsel in felony cases upon request, and when the defendant
could not name counsel, appointed him on their own. 2 SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF
THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 392, 398-99 (1796).
NEW YORK: The extensive study by Goebel and Naughton of colonial law enforce-
ment in this state seems to show that it followed the seventeenth century common law,
though counsel apparently participated fully in informal proceedings like our modem "plea
bargaining." GOEBEL & NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW YORK 573-76
(1944). On the other hand, New York seems to have had a system for appointed
counsel in civil cases. SELECT CASES OF THE MAYOR'S COURT OF NEW Yox CITY 1684-
1754, 176-77 (Morris ed. 1935). The constitution of 1777 says "... . in every trial on
impeachment, or indictment for crimes or misdemeanors, the party impeached or indicted
shall be allowed counsel, as in civil actions." N.Y. CONST. art. xxxiv (1777); 5 THORPE
2635. Whether this provision means that counsel is to be appointed as in civil actions is
hard to tell.
PENNSYLVANIA: The 1682 Frame of Government of this state declared: "[A]ll per-
sons . . . may . . . personally plead their own cause themselves, or if unable, by their
friend . . ." PENN FRAME OF Gov., Laws Agreed upon in England, art. VI (1682) ; 5
THORPE 3060. This probably granted the medieval right to counsel though it is hard to
tell when the word "plead" lost its strictly technical significance and took on the modem
meaning of "argue." The 1701 Charter, however, is explicit in its extension of the com-
mon law: "[A]IIl criminals shall have the same Privileges of Witnesses and Council as
their Prosecutors." PENN CHARTER art. V (1701); 5 THORPE 3079. In an act in 1718
this right was further explained: "Upon all trials of . . . capital crimes . . . learned
counsel [shall be] assigned to the prisoners . . ." 1 LAws OF PENN. 134 (Dallas ed.
1797). The 1776 Constitution, grants the right to a hearing in criminal prosecutions by the
defendant and by his counsel. Declaration of Rights, art. IX, PENN. CoNsT. (1776) ; 5
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THORPE 3083. Granting the right to appointed counsel in all capital cases in the eighteenth
century was the equivalent of granting the right in all felony cases.
NEW JERSEY: The Constitution of 1776 contains a provision similar to the Penn
Charter of 1701. N.J. CoNsT. art. XVI (1776) ; 5 THoP"E 2597. A 1795 statute provides
for the appointment of counsel as the defendant shall desire, if he is unable to obtain
counsel. LAws oF N.J., 162 (Patterson ed. 1800).
DELAWARE: In this state the Penn Charter of 1701 was in force. 1 THORPE 560; see
Rackow, supra at 18. In addition there was a statute in 1719 which had the same pro-
visions requiring the appointment of counsel as the Pennsylvania statute of 1718. 1 DEL.
LAws 66 (1797). The 1776 constitution provides that all previous acts shall be in force
until specifically repealed. DEL. CO NST. art. XXIV (1776) ; 1 THORPE 566: The 1792 consti-
tution includes a right to hearing in every criminal case either by defendant or by counsel
and provides that counsel may at seasonable times have access to those in prison. DEL.
CoNsT. art. I, §§ 7, 12 (1792) ; 1 THORPE 569.
MARYLAND: In Maryland counsel was assigned to civil actions as early as 1721.
PROCEEDINGS OF THE MARYLAND CouRT OF APIEAr.s 1695-1729, 303 (Bond ed. 1933).
The 1776 constitution included a provision requiring simply that the defendant in criminal
prosecutions be allowed counsel. MD. CoNsT. art. XIX (1776); 3 THORPE 1688.
VIRGINIA: Scott in his study of colonial criminal law in Virginia declares that the
common law of England was in force in this state on the matter of counsel. Scorr,
CR NAL LAW ix COLONIAL. VnIRGNIA 78-79 (1930). There is a statute of 1734 which
allows counsel in capital cases upon petition to the court. 4 VA. STATS. 404 (Hening ed.
1820). This provision may simply have been an enactment of the English idea that a man
may not have counsel until he is assigned. On the other hand, it may mean that counsel
in felonies was always at the discretion of the court though this would oppose the com-
mon law principle that counsel in matters of law was a matter of right. Since the com-
mon law seems to have been well known in Virginia, this statute probably aimed at giving
the courts discretion to assign counsel for matters of fact. The courts do not seem to
have interpreted it so broadly, however. In Virginia slaveowners were permitted to de-
fend slaves who were charged with a felony. 4 id. at 128. Scott adopts the cynical attitude
that slaves were too valuable to be hanged without due deliberation. Scorr, op. cit. supra
at 78-79. The provision might also represent a revival of the common law notion of the
defensor the lord who appeared as surety for his man.
NORTH CAROLINA: In 1777 North Carolina passed a statute providing that "[E]very
person accused of any crime or misdemeanor whatsoever, shall be entitled to counsel in
all matters which may be necessary for his defence, as well as to facts as to law ....
1 N.C. R a. LAWS 225 (Iredell & Martin ed. 1804).
SOUTH CAROLINA: In 1712 this state enacted the treason statute of 1695, 7 & 8 Will. 3,
c. 3. S.C. PuB. LAws 25 (Grimk6 ed. 1790). In 1731 it extended the provisions of this
act to all felonies: "[Any person or persons accused of a felony has the right] to advise
with counsel thereupon [the indictment], to make his and their full defence, by council
learned in the law.... And in case any person . . . shall desire council, the court ... is
hereby authorized and required, immediately upon his or their request, to assign.., such
and so many council not exceeding 2, as the person or persons shall desire, to whom such
council shall have free access at all reasonable times." Id. at 129-30.
GEORGIA: In this state the English procedure had been followed since 1754. See
BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 19 (1955). In the Consti-
tution of 1798 there is a provision that "no person, shall be debarred from advocating or
defending his cause before any court or tribunal, either by himself or counsel, or both."
GA. CoNST. art. III, § 8 (1798) ; 2 THORPE 799.
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